Security as a Collective Good: Development and the New Global Order
Charles Martin-Shields argues that Germany and Europe have a chance to make global security about the common good, instead of being defense-first.
When Germany had its federal elections on 23 February voting took place under the specter of a new global security order. With the United States no longer a guarantor of European security for the foreseeable future, Germany’s democratic parties face the task of figuring out what Germany’s role in this new order looks like.
Under these circumstances Germany has, to a degree, had the imprimatur of global leadership thrust upon it. Global leadership has not, however, been a focus of German foreign policy in the post-World War II era. This has to change, and the discomfort that comes with change can also be an opportunity. There is, in the current global tumult, a serious chance to re-evaluate what security policy looks like from the perspective of a global common good. We live in a world that is more interconnected economically and politically than it was when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. For Germany, a country whose economic engine runs on exports and has a world-leading scientific sector, development cooperation-driven security policy offers the chance to move beyond military-first concepts of global security that are no longer fit for purpose in a globally integrated 21st century.
This brings us to the current state of play around German security policy and development cooperation as government coalition negotiations get underway. Friedrich Merz, who will be Chancellor in the next coalition government, has placed the creation of a national security council in the middle of the Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) agenda. The Social Democrats (SPD), CDU’s likely governing partner are increasingly open to the idea of a Chancellery-led security council and lean toward retaining BMZ as a standalone ministry. Looking to a future where Germany will need to play a key role in the European and global security order, the next government coalition should not make a security council and a standalone BMZ an ‘either/or’ question. Germany is going to need both.
Placing development cooperation in the middle of implementing a national security strategy plays to Germany’s current comparative strengths. Germany’s comparative strength vis-à-vis its EU peers is decidedly not its military capacity. This presents a conundrum, since most countries use their militaries for the logistical and hard power aspects of implementing national security policy. Compared to its peers, though, Germany’s global development footprint is huge. Logistically, the German International Cooperation Society (GIZ) boasts offices in 120 countries worldwide, and the capacity to procure equipment and resources globally. The Credit Institute for Reconstruction (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW) has offices in 61 countries, and handles all of Germany’s financial development cooperation. The Bundeswehr, Germany’s military, simply cannot yet match this kind of reach. Right now, Germany’s development aid apparatus represents the best already-existing logistical platform for projecting an integrated national security policy. Dismantling the strongest pillar of Germany’s foreign policy apparatus while trying to build up military capacity would be self-defeating.
Even with development cooperation playing a central role, actualizing a security policy that spans multiple ministries and hundreds of field offices requires a national security council that can serve as a convening forum for relevant ministries to align their activities. Keeping BMZ without a security council means that inter-ministerial squabbles and disputes would continue prevent decisive action – thus, GIZ’s and KfW’s globe spanning capacity would be moot. Conversely, Having a security council while getting rid of BMZ reduces Germany’s readiness by diluting the institutional know-how for working with GIZ and KfW. Other ministries would need to first absorb and onboard BMZ staff, then build GIZ and KfW management capacity following their own bureaucratic logics. Effective security policy requires, in the German case, the practicality and discipline to use development cooperation tools to implement a collectively-oriented security policy immediately, while continuing to develop military capacity over time. To be a global leader, Germany needs both a security council and robust development cooperation.
This is not an argument that the military does not play an important role in security policy. If German is serious about taking a leadership role in global security, it will have to invest in and develop the Bundeswehr. However, this is a multi-year project at a time when there are not multiple years to wait. Development cooperation is where Germany has a demonstrable comparative advantage, and the capacity to implement a common good security policy, which integrates civic and military components. If Germany’s new government organizes a national security council that magnifies the country’s comparative advantages in development cooperation globally, while sustainably growing its military capacity, it could be a beacon for what common interests-oriented security policy can look like. This will not be easy, it is not risk-free, and will require exceptional moral imagination. It is a challenge the new government must embrace if it wants to live up to the election rhetoric of Germany as a European and global leader.
Charles Martin-Shields is a Senior Researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn, Germany.
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