Re-Politicising EU Enlargement
Cornelius Adebahr argues that the EU cannot reduce enlargement to a technical exercise and must get political if it is to persuade its public and potential entrants its worth.
Two things neither officials in Brussels nor the majority of citizens would like to hear these days, are that enlargement is happening, and that it is political. Admittedly, the enlargement of today is not by the EU – which has a self-imposed five-year moratorium on taking in new members – but of NATO.
This other enlargement process apparently is still on track, despite its own hiccups. When the 28 foreign ministers invited Montenegro to join the alliance, they gave a two-fold signal that was also highly political: For one, NATO does not intend to budge on the question of who can join it as a member – even during a period of heightened tension with a Russia, which sees the bloc’s eastward expansion as a ‘national threat’. This could go down as strength; a willingness to stand one’s ground against a declared adversary. For another, however, this move signals NATO’s readiness to disregard Montenegro’s poor record in governance, rule of law, and media freedom – as the EU’s latest ‘enlargement report’ (formerly know as ‘annual progress report’) underlined.
As NATO expansion appears to clearly be political, the EU’s own enlargement policy seems to be lost in technicalities, bare of any ambition – within the union as much as in candidate countries – to actually move on and make further accessions a reality. In that sense, the sorry state of EU enlargement is a direct expression of Europe’s much bigger political void – a particular European listlessness that has festered for more than a decade (the failed referenda of 2005 come to mind) and that now stymies any attempt to leap forward.
People seem to forget that, in the past, EU enlargement has always been political: From France vetoing Britain’s first attempt to become a member to the accession of post-dictatorship Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the ‘big bang’ of Eastern enlargement. Around the time of the latter, some well-meaning thinkers and former officials tried to use a similar political argument in favour of accession of all the Western Balkans countries by 2014 – the 100th anniversary of the beginning of World War I. In reality, it was only Croatia that made it by that date.
Yet, to believe that enlargement can be reduced to a ‘technical exercise’ running in the background while the EU addresses those ‘really political’ crises that it faces, is a delusion. To the contrary, it is precisely because of these crises – from Ukraine and Russia to Syria and the Middle East to the flow refugees towards Europe – that the EU needs to re-politicise its approach to enlargement.
For the Western Balkans, it’s telling that Montenegro with its weak governance record and rampant corruption is considered a front-runner of EU enlargement. Those lagging behind, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia, are all running against a political wall: in the form of the country’s constitution, status, or name. At the same time, Russia has expanded its role in these countries, beyond traditional ties with orthodox countries there. It thrives on, and is attracted by, Brussels’ inability to advance these countries towards the EU. In addition, the refugee crisis has hit the region hard, with nationalist rhetoric flaring up, borders being shut and even bullets shot. However, it’s not just the political chaos that is threatening, but the resurgence of mafia networks that thrived on arms smuggling during the Balkan wars and now benefit from people trafficking. Even without possible violent clashes, the persistent influence of such groups sets these countries further aback on their way to fulfilling the criteria for membership.
How much Turkish accession has become politicised was evident at the EU-Turkey summit in late November, the first in years, which saw Brussels “bribing” Ankara into holding back the refugees. The irony is that, for all those promises of a “fresh start” in bilateral relations, including advances towards visa-free travel and eventual accession, it is Turkey in its current state that neither wants nor qualifies for EU membership.
Then again, Turkey already is a NATO member – as everyone was reminded of when it recently shot down a Russian jet (the first such action by a member of the Western alliance in more than 60 years). Which circles us back to the evidently political nature of membership in such organisations – and the path thereto.
For the EU, one can add another, truly fundamental reason why enlargement is and will be political: Previously dubbed “the EU’s most successful foreign policy”, enlargement has become an indicator of the union’s attractiveness. If enlargement is not in the cards, it means that the EU has lost its magnetism with which it successfully transformed its neighbourhood in the past – whereas NATO can much more rely on its status quo value as a security provider.
That’s why the EU needs to get political on enlargement: Setting out its interests and objectives, creating political momentum, providing funds and initiative, and convincing its already 500 million citizens that there are more Europeans out there wanting to join the club – while staying at home.
