Engaging India with the World: Foreign Policy Imperatives in an Emerging World Order
“The power of nations assembled here is not military power or economic power, nevertheless it is power. Call it moral force”
The aforementioned quote is credited to India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The statement was made at the first Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in 1961. The potency of the statement and the concept attracted many nations, which were grappling with issues of underdevelopment, poverty, hunger and disease, and searching for a voice in a post-colonial era. Undoubtedly, the concept emerged from a sense of fear that increased global interdependency in the backdrop of a weak economic and military scenario would make these nations vulnerable to imperial powers yet again. The movement also reflected a sense of positivity for such nations given their newfound political freedom, which would assist them in addressing the socio-economic issues plaguing their respective countries.
Over the next few decades the NAM evolved in a dynamic fashion responding to the bipolar geopolitical scenario, particularly the Cold War era, in a fashion, which allowed the members to maintain their “strategic autonomy”. This policy allowed nations such as India to deal with both the USSR and US in a manner, which would serve her national interest. At the same time, despite lacking economic and military might, the members propounded a theory of moralpolitik in contrast with the prevalent global practice of realpolitik. This practice was advanced with a profound sense of belief that idealism and moral advocacy would help these nations in achieving global stature and influence, thereby giving them a voice on pressing global issues.
While the policy may have served these nations well in the cold war era, the world has coalesced from a bipolar to a multipolar entity. No matter how much we would like to debate that the emerging world order is a western construct, the fact remains that nations such as India and China have made significant strides on both the economic and military front, and have emerged as a force to reckon with in the past two decades. This holds true for many other high growth emerging markets. The current landscape has compelled the great powers to rebalance their interests in a manner, which is both appreciative and complementary to the development goals of the emerging economies, particularly in Asia. It would be safe to argue that the current natures of global relationships have created a complex matrix, which may not fall squarely within any of the existing foreign policy codes.
From an Indian perspective this presents a greater challenge altogether as NAM as a concept is fast becoming obsolete and it must adopt a more aggressive stance in the international forum on issues of national and international interest. Merely advocating morality in an otherwise amoral world will not allow India to protect her interests globally. Further the Machiavellian practice teaches us that politics employs a different set of moral checks than a private individual. A political leader must essentially assess morality on the basis of the needs of his state. This is a primary reason why international relations remains in a constant state of anarchy where national interests trump international norms. Fitting morals and self-righteousness within this context is a problematic exercise for any country with development needs and security imperatives such as India.
Why India must engage with the World
India finds itself at an opportune moment to eschew a policy of non-alignment and project its economic potential with the objective of fostering robust strategic partnerships. It may be added that it is not India’s righteousness and morality which has invited the attention of the world; rather it is her potential to be a great economic and military power, which may yield beneficial returns for her prospective partners. The naysayers may argue that the thrust of NAM is to pursue an independent policy, which provides room for evaluating issues on its merits and doesn’t preclude strategic alliances. However, in practice, it reflects a lingering mistrust on such issues and perhaps a lack of self-confidence to manage domestic issues, which would allow a successful execution of such strategic partnerships. Thus while India has been pursuing strategic alliances ever since the end of cold war, it remains ambivalent about its response to developments such as the US pivot in Asia or the emergence of Sino-Centric Asia. Although India has categorically stated that it doesn’t want a Sino-Centric Asia, her diplomatic efforts to curb this development have been unsatisfactory. This ranges from n inability to effectively engage with countries in the region on several issues and is highlighted by overtly cautious diplomatic engagements in the South China Sea. There is also fragmented consensus on the feasibility of the US pivot to Asia in curtailing the prominence of China. Perhaps India is not yet in a position to politically, economically or militarily challenge China’s hegemony and is thus reduced to making postures of defiance. The foreign policy prescriptions advanced by NAM fails to appreciate such practices of power politics and therein lays the cause for its ultimate doom.
India has for long been the proponent of a third world approach to international affairs and law, whereby it has become the voice for the rights of developing countries. It is essentially here that India has attempted to project her moral power and assert influence on a global forum. However developments across the globe, both on the economic and security front, begs the question of whether India can afford to be a normative power?
Geographically India finds itself in an extremely complex terrain replete with conflicts and regional competition. Furthermore the growing global interdependency of markets warrants more significant action on the part of India to be able to compete with both developed and emerging economies. To this extent, a policy of strategic autonomy as opposed to one focused on deeper economic and security integration will not augur well for a nation with unique challenges such as India.
Certainly, India’s soft power approach has allowed it to gain the trust of many nations but the multi-polarity of geopolitics at presents requires concrete action in terms of pursuing more robust security and economic alliances.
Let us examine, this trend from the standpoint of an emerging world order in light of hegemonic competition in Asia.
US Rebalancing to Asia
The United States in an effort to curtail the development of a Chinese hegemony in South East Asia and Asia-Pacific is seeking to develop an economic environment which is commensurate with US Foreign Policy agenda. The counter hegemonic push comes in the form of a mega trade alliance, the Trans Pacific Partnership, through which the US is pushing for an economic environment, which will allow its businesses to flourish in the region, thereby providing significant competition to the Chinese regime. The global influence of the US started declining by 1973 as the world coalesced into an essentially tripolar order, which included a Japan-based Asia. The US control over the world economy diminished to roughly 25% from 50%, and top priority was accorded to reconstruction of the industrial world, which would allow business to expand globally (Chomsky, 2003). This is primarily what the Marshall Plan achieved under the Reagan Administration. However, in the past two decades, the role of Japan has diminished in Asia with the emergence of China.
For their part, US policymakers have always acknowledged that South East Asia should be the source for raw materials and resources to its allies such as Britain and Japan, which would allow it to reap the benefits vicariously. The rise of China and its quest for emerging as the next big superpower threatens this order, hence the US pivot to Asia. However the US realizes that achieving this feat, particularly the South East Asian pivot, will be a complex task without the presence of a regional anchor. The regional anchor comes in the form of India, which is against the idea of a Sino-centric Asia given her security dynamics with China and her own economic ambitions. This landscape makes it imperative for both countries to seek mutual collaborations on both the economic and security front.
The threat of a stronger China coupled with the lack of a palpable strategic alliance with a global superpower will complicate the security scenario for India. It must be noted here, that the National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, has acknowledged the two-prong security threat that India faces from Pakistan and China and their respective alliance. To counter this threat and bolster her economic outlook, India can’t afford to restrict itself to a comfortable yet impractical cocoon of Moralpolitik. Indeed any future alliance must give due regard to both military and economic partnership as both are equally valuable pre-requisites in creating an environment of irrevocable interdependency. On the security front, India may be wary of developing stronger ties with US on account of its relationship with its oldest ally, Russia. However, this alliance hasn’t prevented Putin’s Russia from pursuing economic and security partnerships with India’s competitor, China. This development should act as a catalyst towards greater alignment of US’ and India’s respective national interests.
A Chinese Hegemony and India’s Quest for Survival
At the same time, India is correct in pursuing an agenda of sustained economic co-operation with China, which may act as a deterrence for the deteriorating security relations between the two nations. However India also needs to shift from mere defiance posturing in South East Asia and look towards developing an economic doctrine, in the form of a clear trade and investment policy and a security doctrine, in the form of maritime cooperation to achieve her development and national security agenda. To this extent, there needs to be a clear plan on what India’s South China Sea diplomacy should and should not encapsulate; hastened efforts towards executing the Regional Cooperation and Economic Partnership with ASEAN.
A major folly of the non-alignment policy has been its inability to placate the insecurities of India’s immediate neighbors. Through its practice of Moralpolitik, India has always advocated that it remains a peace loving country and doesn’t have an expansionist agenda. However India’s neighbors have viewed this position with a lens of doubt and ulterior motives, and consider India as a regional bully, which interferes with their domestic affairs. India must offer a sense of security in the form of offering concessions and developing healthy economic ties with these countries. The approach needn’t be completely divorced from the practice of Moralpolitik but should remain cognizant of power disparity and the ensuing insecurities in the region. This in turn will allow India to counter China’s agenda of playing on these countries’ respective insecurities. Thus, aligning India’s interests with the interests of her neighbors through robust mechanisms is also essential to her security and economic agenda.
Building more Strategic Partnerships
The environment that may be created through the US pivot to Asia may not be in line with India’s interests and is primarily the reason why it has chosen to stay out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). To counter this trend, India must simultaneously pursue Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with countries that are currently negotiating TPP. It may be added here that FTA negotiations with Australia and New Zealand (TPP negotiating parties) commenced in 2010 but very little development has been made on this front. Hence, India’s outlook cannot be restricted to Asia and it must engage with high growth nations across the world. Ashley J. Tellis from Carnegie Endowment argues that the threats faced by India can no longer be tackled by refurbishing non-alignment under a new guise and it must shed its skepticism in dealing with friendly powers. While this is true, India must also look towards creating a web of interdependency and mutually beneficial relations with emerging markets not only to withstand the vicissitudes of strategic relations, but also to embolden her security and economic ambitions. To this extent, a practice of strategic autonomy will prevent India from achieving her goals and it is imperative for the country to start building relationships on mutual trust and shared growth outlook. Moralpolitik in a geopolitical scenario, which is replete with competing interests, will fail to withstand the turbulences of an emerging world order.
The author is a Policy Analyst at Oval Observer Foundation. The views presented in this article do not reflect the views of the Foundation, its partners and affiliates.
Photo by Navneet Shanu