In Defence of Europe, or why the EU can still Play a Decisive Role in Ukraine

Cornelius Adebahr suggests the EU may be able to mobilize local and international support to address the growing crisis in Ukraine.

Ever since a U.S. official spoke candidly about the role of Europe in the Ukraine crisis, the EU has been everyone’s favourite subject for criticism. It was wrong from the start, many critics say, to have conducted negotiations with Ukraine on the technocratic level, failing to see the geopolitical implications of an Association Agreement with a country Russia considers to be within its exclusive sphere of influence. Critics also assert that the EU should not have presented Ukraine with an either-or choice between a “deep and comprehensive” free trade agreement with Europe and membership in Russia’s Eurasian Economic Community. When protesters gathered on Kiev’s Independent Square, or Maidan, the EU was lambasted for not supporting them enough. And when it did become engaged, sending a small mission of three foreign ministers to mediate in late February, the action was viewed as problematic because the mission represented specific member states rather than the EU as a whole. On top of that, the three members of the delegation were criticized for failing to stick to the agreement reached, once it unraveled after then-President Yanukovich fled the country.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the buildup of troops along Ukraine’s eastern border, a general sense of desperation about Europe’s inability to “get Ukraine right” seems to have set in. With much of the international community refusing to take sides and with the EU’s allegedly dismal performance responding to the crisis so far, it appears that Europe will have difficulty being the driving force behind further developments.

However, it was the idea of Europe that initially drove hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to protest against the Yanukovich government’s decision to forego the EU trade deal. Leaving aside the EU’s clumsy approach to the negotiations, the fact of the matter is that a large number of Ukrainians spoke out in favour of their European future even as EU politicians have struggled to mobilize their citizens to take part in European elections coming up in May. Despite the EU’s coyness when it comes to the promise of EU membership, Ukraine does have a European future—if it wants one—simply because it is located in Europe and is thus eligible for membership according to the EU’s founding treaties.

Assessing a long list of alleged shortcomings

Resentment still exists toward the EU’s administrative and technocratic—as opposed to energetic and strategic—approach to foreign policy. But the EU is a different kind of global actor than the United States or Russia. It is precisely the EU’s norms-based policy of establishing contractual relationships focused on achieving mutual gains, which not only fundamentally distinguishes it from all nation states in foreign policy terms, but also has made it an attractive partner for many countries around the world. Even the Ukrainian President’s refusal to sign an association agreement did not stem from a thorough analysis of his country’s best interest, but from selfish calculations about his personal wealth and future (both of which are in not such good shape now).

Those who argue that the EU should never have negotiated with Yanukovich, given that a kleptocratic leader is the wrong person to reward with an eventual agreement, make a good point. However, short of Ukraine’s descent into Belarusian-style authoritarianism, the EU could not have justified failing to live up to the ten-year-old promises it made to partner countries under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Any slowdown in the ENP countries’ association with the EU would have ultimately played into the hands of Russia.

The fact that the EU presented Ukraine with a choice between the Eurasian Customs Union and a Free Trade Agreement as part of the EU Association Agreement, as Commission President Barroso did in the fall of 2013, is not so much a mistake but rather describes the obvious. That’s why much of the criticism for this decision is unwarranted. For one thing, such criticism comes mostly from Western analysts rather than Ukrainians themselves. In fact, the demonstrators who occupied the Maidan did so not to protest the EU’s binary offer but to contest the eventual choice of their government.

For another, the EU should be commended—not scolded—for taking a firm stance on the bilateral nature of a bilateral agreement. No third party should have a veto over how a sovereign country negotiates its contractual relations with the EU. Finally, while there are certainly ways to preserve much of the economic ‘special relationship’ of – including the existing free trade agreement between – Ukraine and Russia, the heart of the dispute is indeed about two mutually exclusive models of economic integration: It is impossible for one country to align its standards and legislation with two different economic zones, a European and a Eurasian (i.e. Russian) one. Making this clear both to President Yanukovich and to the wider public before the signing of any far-reaching agreement is good policy, not a gaffe.

Leaving aside the current problems in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, one could even argue that the EU’s approach “worked” in that, by providing the tangible carrot of closer association, it enticed the Ukrainian population to oust its elected, but autocratic and corrupt, president. But while the EU may have secretly wished for this kind of “success,” it now finds itself unable to deal with the consequences.

Indeed, the EU was completely unprepared for Russia’s reaction. It certainly did not help that even the United States, with its vast intelligence network, did not foresee the invasion of Crimea, but it is still clear that the EU must enhance its strategic thinking. In particular, the EU must come to terms with the fact that its own approach of peaceful expansion—of both its membership and its model of doing business—may not be perceived by others as benign.

In defence of Europe: Good intentions, bad performance

The EU made two main mistakes: 1) It assumed that Russia would not see its policy towards the neighbourhood as threatening, and 2) It consequently did not prepare for an aggressive Russian reaction. These missteps, however, were hardly the giant blunders some have portrayed them to be. What is more, by being able to revisit its policies in light of current events—both with respect to the economic portion of the Association Agreement and in terms of refining the overall ENP, as proposed by a number of member states, including the three foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle—the EU has shown a degree of flexibility that has gone largely unnoticed.

This flexibility is indicative of the EU’s significant ability to embrace self-criticism and work to correct past policy failures.

In addition, European anger at Russia’s disregard for international law is balanced with an acknowledgement of its own past difficulties following the letter of the law, for instance with respect to Kosovo. Looking closely at the enormous soul-searching that Kosovo’s secession from Yugoslavia produced for EU member states, however, there is no way that this case can be likened—as President Putin did in his “victory speech” in late March—to the unscrupulous and swift annexation of Crimea. The EU does not need lectures on how to abide by international standards. While it does not have a perfect track record in that regard, unlike Putin it has its own critical audience to remind its leaders of their shortcomings.

The tragedy of the EU is that it wants the right things for itself and its neighbours—a “ring of well-governed countries” around it and “no new dividing lines in Europe,” both outlined more than ten years ago in the European Security Strategy—but it has not yet developed the right tools to achieve this goal when confronted by the machinations of less well-meaning “partners.” It is precisely because the EU seeks long-term relationships based on mutual gain that it does not deploy the usual foreign policy tools to impose its will on other nations.

Keep the strategy, but sharpen its policies

The answers to a number of pressing Ukrainian needs exist in various EU documents written over the past decade. The ENP Action Plan of 2008, jointly written and agreed to by Ukraine and the EU, outlined the structural reforms necessary to stave off economic collapse and provide Ukraine with desperately needed credit, which are now likely to be forced on the country by way of conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Joint Statement of the 2006 EU-Ukraine Summit called for a reform of the country’s gas transit system, which remains opaque, corrupt, and dependent upon Russia. The EU-Ukraine Action Plan of December 2004 proposed strengthening local self-government and developing a dialogue on multiculturalism, which would help build a more decentralized political system and more respect for cultural diversity—answers to the grievances of Russian-speaking populations in the country. The security sector was admittedly not part of EU-Ukraine cooperation, and Ukraine’s ill-equipped army and demoralised police force exhibit the signs of a decade of neglect.

This to-do list of reforms demonstrates that the EU should not change its overall strategy but instead execute the one it has followed for years, employing more effective and targeted policies. This means, above all, upholding the rule of international law on the European continent. The first forceful change of European borders since World War II is so outrageous that Europeans must continue to stand up to Russia in order to fight against it. The Council of Europe’s vote to suspend Russian voting rights until the end of the year is an important signal. A Russian decision to withdraw from the continent’s leading human rights watchdog in response would be telling.

Preserving the territorial integrity of Ukraine, especially with regard to its eastern and southern regions, is equally important. This means ensuring that presidential elections take place as scheduled on May 25, followed in due course by parliamentary elections. Close coordination with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which would monitor such elections and already has observers on the ground, is essential for this to happen. It also means strong support for the ongoing constitutional reform process, which may include further decentralisation if the central government in Kiev and regional representatives agree to such a scenario without interference from Moscow.

Finally, the EU—with the support of both the United States and the IMF—should take steps to prevent economic collapse in Ukraine. This may call for unconventional measures enabling the government to pay its bills. However, the prospect of amnesty should get the oligarchs—who, as a result of their personal wealth and political influence, must be part of any “national unity” deal—to underwrite at least a part of a negotiated savings package.

Rule of law, territorial integrity, and support for reform-oriented economic policies have always been the core of the EU’s approach to Ukraine. Those were the right policies before the events of the last several months, and they remain so today. If EU leaders decide to push for them more forcefully, confronting Russia as well as the Ukrainian old elites, it could be the EU itself—and not just the idea of Europe—that is the driving force for a positive outcome in Ukraine.