China: Between the fox and the hedgehog
In this column, Alfredo Toro Hardy resorts to Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor of the hedgehog and the fox to examine China’s contrasting strategies of the last decades.
Isaiah Berlin made the famous metaphoric distinction between the hedgehog and the fox. As he explained, while the spiky creature subordinates everything to a single central vision, the soft-hairy fox pays more attention to the swamps, desserts and chasms that might appear along the way. (Gaddis, 2019, p. 32). By obsessively and even impatiently fixing its attention in 2049 - the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China when the country should have attained global leadership, and the achievement of its dream of national rejuvenation - Chinese leadership is clearly following the hedgehog path. A rigid one. However, as Berlin remarked: “Foxes were better equipped to survive in rapidly changing environments…” (Gaddis, 2019, p. 32).
The years of the fox
Until not so long ago, though, China’s leadership embodied the subtle cleverness of the fox. Deng Xiaoping played a central role in this regard. The maxims contained in his final speeches, pronounced during an iconic inspection tour of Southern China, epitomized this kind of ingeniousness. According to Henry Kissinger: “In time, Deng’s ‘Southern Tour’ would take on an almost mythical significance, and his speeches would serve as the blueprint for another two decades of political and economic policy” (Kissinger, 2012, p. 441). Among such maxims, the following one is famous: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” (Toro Hardy, 2020, p. 25).
So efficient was China while it followed Deng’s advice, that their scientists had the unrestricted opportunity to penetrate American universities, laboratories and companies, gaining access to technology that enhanced their country’s power. At the same time, China not only greatly benefited from America’s market, but also from its growing investments and technology transfer. Moreover, it was able to enjoy the rewards of its global soft power stardom.
Writing in 2008, before the fox began to turn itself into a hedgehog, Mark Leonard said:
“Like Europe [China] has many twenty-first century qualities. Its leaders preach a doctrine of stability and social harmony. Its military talks more about soft than hard power. Its diplomats call for multilateralism rather than unilateralism. And its strategists rely more on trade than war to forge alliances and conquer new parts of the world” (Leonard, 2008, p. 109).
Not surprisingly, in September 20, 2005, Oxford Analytica reported on a survey about China by the BBC, which found that the majority of the world’s public opinion, in five continents, had a favorable view of that country. Even more amazing, according to the analysis of the survey, was the fact that China’s neighbors view it with favorable eyes. The prevailing perception of that country was that of a benevolent emerging superpower.
This showed that a carefully crafted China “brand” had been highly successful. Indeed, in the spring of 2004, the Chinese Communist Party had gathered several dozen Chinese scholars and intellectuals on the island of Hainan, with the purpose of giving form to a positive image of China. One, susceptible of being projected internationally. This translated into the coined concept of “peaceful rise”. A rise that was not threatening to anyone. It was a brilliant soft power marketing strategy that provided China with tremendous dividends of good will (Cooper Ramo, 2007). Moreover, it allowed China to accomplish the geopolitical miracle of becoming the number two global power without alarming the top one. Something rarely, if ever, seen in history.
Few countries had engaged in such a systematic and conscious effort to project a constructive international image, with so much success. At least, until 2008. Henceforward, the first spikes appeared, as the fox began transmuting itself into a hedgehog. The convergence of several events in that year changed China’s perception of itself, making its leaders much more assertive. Among them, the sweeping efficiency with which China avoided contagion from the largest global economic crisis since 1929, and the fact that China’s sustained economic growth was the fundamental factor in preserving the world from a major economic downturn. This was reinforced by a boost in Chinese self-esteem, provided by the highly successful Beijing Olympic games of that year. In sum, in seemed unnecessary for China to keep hiding strengths and biding its time.
The years of the hedgehog
Although this turning point materialized under Hu Jintao, changes accelerated dramatically after Xi Jinping’s arrival to power in 2012-2013. Under his leadership, China became much more belligerent in relation to its regional ambitions, and increasingly boastful about the country’s capabilities and global goals. Moreover, it began to show a linear rigidity in its actions that contradicted the cunning and the sagacity that had been China’s trademark during most of the preceding decades. As Xi explained at a speech delivered at the 19th Communist Party Congress, on October 2017:
“Rooted in a land of more than 9.6 million square kilometers, nourished by a nation’s culture of more than 5,000 years, and backed by the invincible force of more that 1.3 billion people, we have an infinitely vast stage of our era, a historical heritage of unmatched depth and incomparable resolve that enable us to forge ahead…” (Xinhua, 2017).
According to Jonathan D.T. Ward:
“From outer space to the deep sea, from Africa to the Artic, from artificial intelligence to hypersonic missiles that can ‘kill’ American aircraft carriers, the Chinese Communist Party has mobilized its country to become global leaders in virtually every form of economic, military, technological, and diplomatic activity on earth” (Ward, 2019, Introduction, loc. 266/6589).
Needless to mention, as well, its massive military buildup, which includes tripling its strategic nuclear capacity by 2035.
China, as perceived by Xi, is in the crest of a historical wave: The point in time when a big power pushover is attainable. In several of his foreign policy addresses since 2017, Xi has been insisting that the world is in the midst of “great changes unseen in a century”. This implies that thanks to unprecedented geopolitical and technological shifts, the world order, and not just simply the regional one, can be redefined in Chinese terms. For Xi, the changes in flux are not only the result of China’s growing power but also of what he perceives as the United States’ decline. Not surprisingly, after the storming of the U.S. Capitol in January 2021, Xi stated that “time and momentum are in our side”. An integral part of Beijing’s geopolitical push consists in persuading countries, both in Asia and around the world, that Chinese world dominance is inevitable, which should induce them to begin deferring to its demands (Blanchette, 2021; Doshi, 2021).
By becoming an unmalleable hedgehog, devoid of all cunning foxiness, China has suffered big in terms of foreign policy’s efficiency. The country is now being confronted by a gigantic geostrategic containment block, integrated by nations, mechanisms and organizations from four continents. Moreover, several developed countries are increasing their tariffs on Chinese products, decoupling from its supply chains, and impeding its access to key technological products or processes. Xi’s calculations that acting boldly became possible as China was powerful enough, its economy big enough, its neighbors dependent enough, and the U.S. resolve uncertain enough, have not only proved wrong, but have grossly misfired. As a result, the costs linked to the attainment of China’s regional and global objectives have skyrocketed.
On top, this comes at a point in time when, domestically, China faces not only chronically unresolved problems but also new serious ones. Among them, its demographic or aging trap, its middle-income trap, its public debt trap, the bursting of its housing bubble, its chronic misallocation of resources, and its huge environmental challenges. Moreover, as a result of the unmalleable nature of the hedgehog, numerous other problems have materialized. These resulted from the rigid Zero Covid policy, from the over regulation of its private sector, with particular reference to the high-tech one where the bulk of its productivity resides, and from the imposition of restrictions upon foreign investors. Not surprisingly, a serious crisis now affects its economy, including a worrisome deflation.
Historical judgement
But, was it necessary for Beijing to have relinquished its foxy qualities in such a sudden and drastic manner? Keeping Deng’s strategy alive (or at least part of it) for a longer period, should not have been all that difficult for a Civilization-State as China, where time is measured in a different scale than in the West. Indeed, Zhou Enlai’s famous 1971 answer to Kissinger, that it was still “too early to tell” the implications of the French Revolution, says it all (Rudd, 2018). Judged by its own historical standards, and having the classical teachings of its Warring States Period’s authors (such as Qu Yuan or Su Qin) as a guide, China’s current strategy seems precipitated and clumsy. According to John Lewis Gaddis’ reading of Sun Tsu, wise statespersons should follow some basic rules: “They’ll sail with winds, not against them. They’ll skirt swamps, not slog through them. They’ll avoid battles until they’re sure they can win them” (Gaddis, 2019, p. 86).
Deng Xiaoping’s strategic guidance was just the most recent expression of the subtle cleverness normally associated with this ancient civilization. A civilization, where the attributes of the fox, and not those of the hedgehog, have traditionally been praised.
Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD, is a retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
Photo by JackerKun
References
Blanchette, Jude (2021). “Xi’s gamble: The race to consolidate power and stave off disaster”. Foreign Affairs. July/August.
Cooper Ramo, Joshua (2007). Brand China. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
Doshi, Rush (2021). “The long game: China’s grand strategy to displace American order”. Brookings. August 2.
Gaddis, John Lewis (2019). On Grand Strategy. London: Penguin Books.
Kissinger, Henry (2012). On China. New York: Penguin Books.
Leonard, Mark (2008). What Does China Think? New York: HarperCollins.
Rudd, Kevin (2018). “’Too Early to Tell’: Kevin Rudd on U.S.-China Relations, FDI and Switzerland”. Asia Society, Zurich, November 14.
Toro Hardy, Alfredo (2020). China Versus the US: Who Will Prevail? New Jersey: World Scientific.
Xinhua (2017). “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th National Congress”, November 3.
