Colonel, Your Black Passport Is Ready
Black with gold lettering. It feels heftier than most passports, maybe due to the thicker paper used on the visa pages. Before it is born, it is simply black vinyl and a dozen sheets of paper. It’s sewn at the spine, gilt on its face. It is transformed into a nomad’s codex.
I had just arrived in Mbale, Uganda to sleep for the night when I heard on the news that Uganda had offered asylum to Col. Muammar Gaddafi. The announcement that Uganda would welcome Gaddafi, were he to seek exile here, hardly made the tail end of the evening news, but I found it fascinating.
The Gaddafi family has substantial investments in the region, including in Sudan (though not, to my knowledge, in soon-to-be-independent Southern Sudan), but the public story does not have revenue at its center. President Museveni wrote a long letter of praise for Gaddafi, including the statement that “Gaddafi, whatever his faults, is a true nationalist. I prefer nationalists to puppets of foreign interests.”
Why is Uganda so eager to help Gaddafi escape his predicament? To understand this requires a bit of history ordinarily discussed only by historians, political theorists, and mercenary companies.
Gaddafi has a long history with Museveni. Gaddafi helped Museveni force out his predecessor, Idi Amin, by lending troops to Museveni and even hiring mercenaries from surrounding regions. The flow of weapons between Libya and Uganda slowed, but mutual friendships flourished. Both signed deals with Royal Dutch Shell and other corporations active in the region. The two entered into (or refused to enter into) treaties at similar times. Both maintained a view that a united Africa would be desirable.
Gaddafi favours tribal or local council rule over land and resources, things which are common in Uganda. The southern reaches of Libya are linked to Sudan and, in turn, to Uganda, though the poorly-developed infrastructure between Juba and Khartoum provides a logistical barrier. Gaddafi’s vision of a United States of Africa would include Uganda, though whether the economic concept that Libya could reliably fund the degree of development spending needed in sub-Saharan Africa is an open question. Uganda continues to accept aid and development funding from a variety of sources, particularly to support rural projects.
However, despite these similarities, Gaddafi’s outright flight to Uganda seems unlikely. Uganda is a signatory to multiple treaties and accords, including the Statute of Rome, that would give jurisdiction over Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court. Uganda also has a history of recognizing mutual criminality as a theory of international jurisdiction and as a justification for extradition. Hence, Uganda seems an unlikely haven for Gaddafi, but unlikely things happen daily in the Libyan crisis.
Uganda’s offer of safe haven may be intended as a “one club” bid, allowing others to join in making bids for Gaddafi’s favour without being first-movers. If so, it seems more likely that other non-signatories may follow with more attractive bids, including those in the Caribbean, Latin America, or the Pacific islands. I do not believe whether Gaddafi will fight to the death depends on his fanaticism or tenacity; it depends upon which alternatives are on offer and from whom.
