China’s Country Status: Unpacking the Political Implications for Global Cooperation

Stephan Klingebiel and Hangwei Li argue that China's developing-country status no longer describes reality.

According to the World Bank, high-income economies are defined as those with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita over $14,005. China is expected to transition from a “middle-income” to a “high-income country” (HIC) by 2026. Consequently, China is projected to graduate from the OECD list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligible countries in 2029, three years after crossing the threshold. Yet, China continues to emphasize its status as “the world’s largest developing country.” This raises critical questions about China’s evolving role in the Global South, its responsibilities within multilateral frameworks, and its approach to international development cooperation.

China’s development status is not merely a technical classification or an academic exercise; it is fundamentally a political matter. In 2023, a U.S. Senate committee passed the “Ending China’s Developing Nation Status Act,” which requires the Secretary of State to advocate for changing China’s status as a developing country in international organizations. The U.S. has also pushed the United Nations to limit multilateral support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative, highlighting tensions between China’s self-identification and its growing geopolitical influence. Despite these pressures, Chinese leaders have reaffirmed their alignment with the developing world. At the United Nations (UN), China is a member of the Group of 77 (G77) as an alliance of countries from the Global South. At the 2023 BRICS Summit, President Xi Jinping declared, “China has been and will always remain a member of [the] developing countries”. Similarly, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that China is “an ex-officio member of the ‘Global South’ and will always be a member of the big family of developing countries”.

Issues and Consequences

As the world’s largest CO2 emitter, China’s development status is a focal point in debates on climate finance. At COP 29 in Baku (November 2024), several representatives from the Global South argued that China should no longer benefit from privileges accorded to developing nations. Generally, international organizations grant developing countries specific rights and preferential treatment. For example, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD regularly compiles a list of countries eligible to receive support classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA). China is expected to be removed from this list in September 2029, three years after achieving HIC status. Although China’s economic strength and substantial foreign reserves minimize its need for concessional funding, several factors drive its desire to maintain its developing-country status.

• Increased Responsibilities: Reclassification as a HIC means more expectations and responsibilities. As an HIC, China would be expected to shift from receiving to contributing more to global development efforts, particularly climate commitments, and debt relief. Currently, China still benefits from UN development programs within its borders. However, research suggests that China has been reluctant to commit additional resources, especially when it comes to financing for development and debt relief.  This reluctance is reflected by China’s declining overseas development finance. Given the significant challenges facing China’s domestic economy, expanding responsibilities in international development cooperation may not align with China’s best interests.
• Historical Solidarity: China’s self-identification as a developing country is deeply rooted in its history. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, China stood in solidarity with newly independent nations in Asia and Africa. While it was not officially part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), China embraced its  core principles, advocating for sovereignty and self-determination of “Third-World” nations. China’s historical alignment with anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements reinforced its claim as a crucial part of the developing world.
• Socio-economic Realities: Despite its status as the world’s second-largest economy, China faces challenges typical of developing nations, including significant regional disparities and income inequality. For instance, in 2023, Beijing’s per capita GDP reached $28,295, comparable to many advanced economies. Meanwhile, Gansu Province’s per capita GDP was approximately $6,800, highlighting stark economic divides within the country.
• Geopolitical Leverage: China’s self-identification as a developing nation enhances its diplomatic clout, particularly in the Global South. Initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative  resonate with narratives of South-South cooperation and global solidarity. By maintaining its developing-country status, China positions itself as a champion of the Global South, countering U.S. and European influence while also competing with India for regional leadership. Moreover, China’s ambitions in the Global South are not only to become a dominant financial power, but also to assert normative and discursive powers, demonstrated by its expanding media and external propaganda efforts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. As shown in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2024, China has emphasized its own modernization experience as an alternative to Western approaches.

Global South Identity and Country Reclassification

China is likely to lose its developing-country status within major international organizations soon. However, this shift, long overdue, does not preclude China from being considered part of the Global South—a term rooted in historical and political identity rather than purely economic metrics.

As debates about China’s status intensify, its role in the Global South and its contributions to global governance will remain central to discussions on global cooperation. Whether China embraces the responsibilities that come with its growing influence or continues to leverage its developing-country narrative will shape its place in the world order.

Stephan Klingebiel heads the research department “Inter- and Transnational Cooperation” at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). He previously led the UNDP Global Policy Centre in Seoul (2019–2021) and the KfW Development Bank’s office in Kigali, Rwanda (2007–2011). He is also a guest professor at the University of Turin (Italy), a senior lecturer at the University of Bonn, and an Honorary Distinguished Fellow at Jindal University (India).

Hangwei Li is a senior researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and an Associate at the Megatrends Afrika Project. She received her PhD at SOAS, University of London and was previously an associate professor at China Agricultural University. Hangwei's research lies in the fields of politics, international development, and political communication, with a particular focus on China’s multifaceted engagement with the Global South, especially Africa.

Photo by Cheng Shi Song