Russia’s policy towards Syria: Nyet is not enough

As Syria descends into chaos, its longstanding ally Russia becomes more and more the focus of attention. Moscow’s policy is dubbed as a throwback to Soviet times because of the continuous refusal to step up pressure on President Bashar al-Assad. But if Russian leaders get it right, the crisis in Syria could be Russia’s chance to become an indispensable international actor, constructively shaping global politics. Thus far, Russia was desperately craving great power status but has proved unable to bear the responsibilities. Syria could be a watershed for Russia’s role in international relations.

Over the last year, the conflict in Syria has become far more than a regional conflict. While policy-makers still speak of the ‘threat of civil war’, UN under-secretary for peacekeeping operations Herve Ladsous first acknowledged that Syria is already in the midst of a civil war (1) – and a test case for the conflict resolution capabilities of the international community. As the country implodes, the world debates about the right approach: keep the regime in power and turn a blind eye to the gross human rights violations or intervene for humanitarian reasons in an ethnic and religious mayhem? And who would do it, at the end? The indecisiveness of the international community in Syria is alarmingly reminiscent of the Balkans case in the 1990’s.

To facilitate the decision-making in such dilemmas, the UN World Summit in 2005 adopted the norm of ‘responsibility to protect’(2) stating that the international community has the responsibility to intervene through diplomatic, economic and even military measures if a state fails to protect its population from mass atrocities. Even Russia and China signed up and yet both countries are now the main stumbling blocks for any kind of intervention.(3) Despite frustrations, it is important to understand that Russia does not act the way it does out of immorality or simply to annoy the West. The fundamental tenets, fears and interests of Russian foreign policy are on display in the Syrian case.

First of all, the Kremlin hates revolutions. From the beginning, the Arab Spring was met with strong scepticism and mocked as the ‘Arab Fall’. Putin himself is deeply suspicious of movements from below.(4) From his view, mass movements are either foreign-funded attempts to overthrow the rulers (one reason for his suspicion over Saudi Arabia’s role in Syria), or if authentic, a threat to stability and security. Violent protests are quickly condemned as terrorist acts. In a recent article for the Huffington Post, Russian foreign minister Lavrov wrote: ‘The shelling of residential areas by government troops is unacceptable, but it cannot be viewed as an indulgence for terrorist acts in Syrian cities, for murders conducted by insurgents opposed to the regime, including those of Al-Qaida’(5). Aleksey Pushkov, head of the Duma foreign affairs committee, compared the situation in Syria with Chechnya,(6) thereby implicitly suggesting that the use of force might be sometimes necessary to avoid a country’s break-up and regain stability.

From a Russian perspective, the West has exacerbated the instability created by the Arab revolutions and exploited the situation for its own gain. The crucial example is Libya. In Lavrov’s words, the West tried to ‘shape a new political reality to [its] taste while taking advantage of the softening of state structures’.(7) Russia is convinced its abstention in the Security Council gave NATO a carte blanche to pursue regime change without further consultation with Russia. Dictatorship was replaced by chaos, and consequently Putin stated in his foreign policy manifesto: ‘No one should be allowed to use the Libyan scenario in Syria.’(8)

President Bashar al-Assad and his secular regime are perceived as the anchor of stability against Islamist insurgents and the Kremlin is determined to prevent an overthrow of the regime by foreign intervention. Not because of some sort of autocratic solidarity – the relationship was never warm-hearted – but because Russian leaders do not want to repeat the same mistake and lose all say and influence.(9) Furthermore, Syria is strategically and geographically more important to Russia than Libya. Although trade and economic relations are often overestimated,(10) Russia is Syria’s most important arms supplier (11) and the Tartus naval base counts as Moscow's only military base outside the former USSR territory.

Against this backdrop, gross human rights violations are not likely to cause a change in Russia’s foreign policy course.(12) Yes, Russia agreed to the UNSC condemnation of the Houla massacre, but in principle the Kremlin assumes that human rights concerns are only a fig-leaf for the West and Sunni countries to pursue their interests. Russia believes it’s not yet betting on a losing horse with Assad. But to leave the door open, Moscow cautiously signalised openness to the Yemen option, which would see Assad step down with impunity but his regime still in power, possibly followed by presidential elections.

Russia managed to become the key international actor in this conflict; a diplomatic success for a former superpower which feels all too frequent bypassed and neglected. However, Russia confines itself to an obstructive force by blocking all resolutions and hiding behind the Annan plan. But nyet is not enough. Russia has to use its leverage on Syria to come up with alternative ideas. How about a Lavrov plan, perhaps modelled on the Dayton Agreement, as proposed by Fyodor Lukyanov?(13) Regrettably, the lack of far-sighted strategic thinking has always been the Achilles’ heel of Russian foreign policy.(14)
Russia’s ability to lead suffers from its confrontational approach. Moscow has to learn that mutually acceptable solutions and rallying support for your arguments is the name of the game in international diplomacy. By acting along these lines, Russia could not only do Syria good but also itself and its standing in the world.

(1) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18417952
(2) http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/World%20Summit%20Outcome%20Document.pdf
(3) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/23/the_axis_of_no?hidecomments=yes
(4)  He experienced the fall of the Berlin Wall as KGB agent in Dresden. 
(5) http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sergei-lavrov/russia-syria-on-the-right-side-of-history_b_1596400.html
(6) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/middleeast/in-stance-on-syria-russia-takes-substantial-risks.html
(7) http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sergei-lavrov/russia-syria-on-the-right-side-of-history_b_1596400.html?utm_hp_ref=uk
(8) http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18252/
(9) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137078/dmitri-trenin/russias-line-in-the-sand-on-syria
(10) In 2010, Syria was 21st of Russia’s main export partners and 27th of Russia’s main trading partners. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf
(11) http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/rise-in-international-arms-transfers-is-driven-by-asian-demand-says-sipri
(12) As Mona Yacoubian argues: http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrian-turning-point-russia/p28388
(13) http://en.rian.ru/columnists/20120607/173895703.html
(14) Levitin, Oleg, ‘Inside Moscow’s Kosovo Muddle’, Survival 42, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 130-140.