Populism in foreign policy? The case of Turkey

Iulia-Alexandra Oprea, Associate Fellow at Center for Middle East and Global Order, explores Turkey's use of populist narratives to legitimize its recent assertiveness on the international stage.

The global rise of populism has reshaped political landscapes around the world, influencing not only domestic policy choices but increasingly, foreign policy decisions too. In Turkey, populism is not a novel experience, nor a mere symptom of recent autocratization, but rather a chronic phenomenon in the country’s multi-party political history. Historically, the Turkish doctrine of populism, halkçılık, can be traced back to the early Republican years, to the single party era, as one of the six fundamental principles of Kemalism. In the republican narrative (Turkish) people living in Anatolia were repressed and exploited by the Ottoman elite and needed to assert their sovereignty. The “people” have been central in the political discourses of both left and right, as well as secular, nationalist and Islamist parties and instrumentalized to different ends in different periods. Virtually all major players in Turkish politics have been labeled as populists, including the secularist Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), the conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), the left-leaning, pro-minority People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), and even some movements, such as the Gezi protests. While scientists have not agreed yet upon a comprehensive definition of populism (however, they do agree that anti-elitism and people-centrism are essential elements), the Turkish case enabled further conceptual laxity, making it even more difficult to define the concept (1).

Populism is often described as a “thin-centred ideology” meaning it centers political discourse around the people–elite divide, but the specific nature of this divide, and who belongs to which group, is shaped by a more coherent host ideology adopted by populists. When it comes to the AKP government’s policy, as Taş demonstrates, the has party switched between diverse ideologies, the only constant being populism. In the first years of governance when the AKP embraced conservative democracy and pursued EU accession by adopting neo-liberal reforms, the “people” were conservative Anatolians oppressed by the Kemalist elite, while the measures taken were legitimized by referring to the Ottoman experience of pluralism. Thus, it is not a surprise that EU reforms were used to dismantle the Kemalist/secular control over the military and judiciary. Later, in the context of stalled EU negotiations, growing islamophobia in the West and unfolding of the Arab Spring the AKP’s definition of “the people” changed, encompassing Sunni Muslims, while the “elite” was identified with the so-called “Deep State”. Ideologically, in this period, the party shifted towards Islamism. The Gezi protests of 2013 and the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, led to the ruling party’s embrace of nationalism. The AKP identified a new “elite” opposing the “people”, now defined as “Turkish Muslims”: the “imperialist” West and international organizations, seeking to divide Turkey.

An important element of populism is its strong narrative and its ability to convince voters by oversimplifying reality in a Manichean way. Populist narratives are employed to gain and keep supporters as well to legitimize political decisions. An example of populist foreign policy discourse is the government's harsh public response to 10 Western embassies’ request to release Osman Kavala, an activist accused of orchestrating the Gezi protests. Domestically, the situation was framed as foreign powers’ mingling in Turkish politics. President Erdoğan publicly announced that he will expel the ambassadors releasing the statement. However, the expulsion did not materialize, but resulted in an ambiguous restatement by the embassies, which included their obligation to refrain from involvement in the domestic affairs of the host countries. The outcome was celebrated by AKP supporters as Erdoğan’s victory in the face of Western powers aiming to undermine Turkish sovereignty while abroad it was interpreted as a way of preventing further diplomatic crises.

While the government’s populist policy makes the headlines, the AKP is the only Turkish party using populist discourse in defining its foreign policy objectives. In the latest elections, CHP, the main opposition party, was not as liberal and moderate as the international community expected, but similarly nationalist and populist to the ruling party, displaying strong anti-immigrant attitudes. The opposition’s anti-immigrant narrative blamed Syrian refugees for the economic difficulties faced by Turkish citizens, a discourse that has resonated with the domestic audience amidst worsening recession, rising unemployment, and inflation in the country. Both the AKP and CHP promised the return of Syrian refugees to their country in their pre-election political discourses. Furthermore, all major parties (except from the HDP and some pro-HDP circles within the CHP) supported the 2020 military operations in Syria (as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh war) and reached a consensus on the populist narrative of national sovereignty, unity, and the presence of an international threat to the country.

Another example of foreign policy objective with strong populist overtones shared by nearly every party in Turkey (except from the left-leaning HDP) is the Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) doctrine, developed by admirals within the Turkish Navy in the 2000s, who feared that Turkey’s national interests would be compromised in pursuit of potential EU accession as a result of AKP’s support for the Annan Plan to reunify Cyprus. Obviously, at the time, the doctrine was not endorsed by the Turkish government. However, the discovery of gas deposits in the eastern Mediterranean by Israel (2009), Cyprus (2011) and Egypt’s (the large Zohr deposit in 2015) has led to an increased interest in water-control strategies. The establishment of an Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2019 by Egypt (with Cyprus, Israel and Palestine, as producers, and Greece, Jordan and Italy, importers), to which Turkey was not invited prompted the AKP government to favor the Mavi Vatan doctrine. As a result, Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood) to establish a common maritime border, allowing the AKP to address two issues with one solution: on the one hand, portraying itself as the defender of Turkish national interests by preventing the formation of a Helleno-Egyptian maritime territorial axis, on the other hand, showing support to the Tripoli-based government affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. While there have been on-going efforts to normalize Greek-Turkish relations, the Mavi Vatan concept was included in Turkish school curriculum, in the 9th grade geography textbooks, a decision which sparked criticism in the Greek media. The doctrine is unlikely to be completely abandoned by successive governments in the future since it reached consensus at society level.

Populists favor clientelist approaches over carefully planned policies. They prioritize short-term gains over long-term investment, value quantity over quality, and seek immediate material rewards rather than focusing on long-term sustainable solutions. Their motto is “now and here for the supporters”. Consequently, pragmatism and transactionalism are key features in all areas of (populist) policy, including foreign policy. This may explain the ideological inconsistency displayed by the AKP, evident in its policy during the Arab Spring. While Turkey opposed military intervention in Libya in an effort to safeguard its economic interests, it called for a regime change in Egypt, but on the other hand, chose not to weigh in on the fates of Yemen and Bahrain (2). Moreover, considering the country’s economic challenges and need for foreign investments, Ankara has recently started to distance itself from Arab Islamists (whom it previously supported) trying to reestablish its ties with autocrats from the Middle East and North Africa. As a result, several media channels affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey were closed down or asked to moderate their contents, while some Brotherhood members were allegedly asked to leave the country. President Erdoğan also visited Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar in an effort to secure economic support, following the normalization process that started in 2022.

Donald Trump’s presidency was perceived positively in Ankara, due to both presidents’ focus on pragmatism and material gains, as well as to their similar ways of doing politics (populist approach). However, the American-Turkish relations weren’t smooth during Trump’s first presidential mandate either and Trump’s policy will likely impact Turkey’s foreign policy in several areas. In Syria, Erdoğan aims to achieve a political resolution to the conflict that would enable the return of the 4.7 million Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey – thus keeping its election promises – and to counter the U.S.-backed Kurdish SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), regarded by Turkey as an extension of the outlawed PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). The fall of the Assad regime, coupled with a fading Russian and Iranian influence (supporters of Assad) in the country and Trump’s distancing from the conflict (at least at the moment) gives Turkey more room for maneuver and influence in the region. On the other hand, the U.S. support for Israel and Ankara’s pro-Hamas stance can strain relations. So far, Turkey has been unsuccessful in its efforts to mediate the Hamas-Israel conflict, although positioning itself as a defender of Palestinian people is one major themes of the AKP’s foreign policy. Turkey’s application to join BRICS as a balancing act to diversify its allies might not be well received by Trump, who recently threatened the group to face 100% tariffs if they replace US dollar in their international trade. 

Turkey has become more assertive on the international stage, following a “360-degree foreign policy”, with the aim of seeking greater strategic independence in its foreign policy as well as strategic autonomy in key fields such as security, economy and energy. This orientation is evident in its interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative to, or rather complementing its NATO membership. Furthermore, according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey is part of Europe and European integration remains a strategic priority. However, its relationship with the West is not the only relationship Turkey seeks to cultivate. Ankara has increased its diplomatic presence globally: the 2024 Global Diplomacy Index ranks Turkey as the 3rd most important diplomatic player in the world after China and the US with 252 posts operating abroad. While most of them (40%) are still based in Europe, many of Ankara’s new diplomatic representatives were opened in Africa and the Middle East, showing an increased interest in the region. The country also advocates for the so-called Ankara Consensus, an alternative model of development to the Beijing Consensus and Washington Consensus, that prioritizes stability over democracy, promotes state-driven economic growth, and pursues a foreign policy aimed at enhancing Turkey's influence and standing on the global stage. Ankara actively aims to expand its foreign policy opportunities by considering local and international developments and engaging populist narratives to legitimize its decisions. 

Dr. Iulia-Alexandra Oprea is an Associate Fellow at CMEG and an associate member of the Balkan History Association in Bucharest. 

Photo by Burak The Weekender

Notes

(1)  Spyros A. Sofos, Turkish Politics and ‘the People’ Mass Mobilisation and Populism, Edinburgh University Press, 2022, 4-5

(2) Birol Başkan and Ömer Taşpinar, The Nation or The Ummah. Islamism and Turkish Foreign Policy, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2021, 3.