America, First in Africa? - How and Why Badmouthing China in Africa did not Profit the U.S. under Trump 1.0
Afa’anwi Che argues that, despite U.S. criticisms, Beijing remains a resilient and trusted partner for African states.
American transactionalism under Trump potentially generates global anxiety, including among African states with a long history of exposure to American and Western influences. Much has been written about implications of a second Trump term for great power competition, with some analysts forecasting an intensification of U.S. vilification of China and its engagements in the Global South. In the 21st century, China has surpassed the U.S. and its European allies to become the leading bilateral trade partner, creditor, and investment source for many African states. This positions Africa as a key battleground for Trump in efforts to contain China.
The first Trump administration criticised Beijing’s relations with African states as exploitative and promoted U.S. partnership as a more altruistic and just alternative. Did Trump’s criticisms of China get African states to buy and borrow more from the U.S.? Drawing on data from databases on trade, foreign direct investment, and loans, this post contends that, despite the derogatory rhetoric from the Trump presidency regarding China, African states maintained stronger business ties with Beijing.
America’s influence in Africa may further diminish as certain African countries, particularly South Africa, explore alternative markets and partnerships in reaction to a recent executive order signed by Trump that froze aid. Based on insights from relational trust theory, I attribute America’s shortfall and China’s resilience in Africa to differing perceptions of trustworthiness between the major powers. To enhance its credibility and fortunes in a rapidly industrializing African economy, the second Trump administration must abandon its disparaging rhetoric about China, which does not align with the experiences of many African states.
Aiming for ‘America First’ in Africa
Trump is known for his transactional approach to international politics. He likes to propose and negotiate deals that align with his ‘America First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ mantras. In the African context, U.S. transactionalism predates Trump, as evidenced by Washington’s longstanding practice of linking development assistance to reform concessions. However, under Trump, and amid Sino-American rivalry, U.S. officials appear to focus less on reforms and more on criticizing China, portraying Beijing as a threat to the sovereignty of African states. For the U.S. under Trump, distancing from China has become essential for securing business deals. Officials in the first Trump administration condemned Chinese loans as egoistic and detrimental to the sovereignty of African states. For instance, John Bolton, a former U.S. national security adviser to Trump criticised China of using loans as a strategic tool “to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands”.
Accusing Beijing of creating debt traps to ultimately seize control of not only Chinese-funded infrastructure but also natural resources, some U.S. legislators urged the Trump administration to counter China's influence. Senior officials adopted a zero-sum approach, aiming to ensure that China’s losses translate into gains for America, as highlighted in various official speeches compiled in "Trump on China: Putting America First," edited by Robert O’Brien, another former national security adviser.
Turning a Deaf Ear
Despite Washington’s criticisms, many African countries conducted more business transactions with China than with the U.S. during Trump’s first term. A comparative analysis of data from a recently compiled African debt database reveals that, throughout Trump’s previous tenure, African nations borrowed significantly more from China (23.3 billion USD) than from the U.S. (1.07 billion USD). In terms of foreign direct investment during Trump’s first term, flows from China to Africa were more than double those from America. Additionally, most African countries maintained stronger trade relations with China compared to the U.S. For instance, in the continent's two largest economies, South Africa and Nigeria, the share of imports from the U.S. stagnated around 6% and 10% from 2017 to 2020, while the share from China surged from 18.33% in 2017 to 20.76% in 2020 for South Africa, and from 18.70% to 28.76% for Nigeria. Similar trends are observed at the aggregate level for sub-Saharan Africa regarding import shares from the U.S. compared to China.
Deducing a Deficit of Trust in Trump’s America
Why did the vilification of China as a threat to the sovereignty of African states fail to deter them from Beijing and generate greater gains for America? Here, I apply relational trust theory, which has been utilized across various disciplines, including economics and political science, to understand why some interpersonal relationships thrive while others falter.
It is reasonable to personify states, as suggested by the application of relational trust theory to international relations. States consist of people, some of whom govern and make foreign policy decisions, which underscores the relevance of trust. This article’s relational trust framework deduces differing perceptions of trustworthiness between Washington and Beijing based on their respective past and projected interactions with African countries. The distinct historical experiences of African states with Western colonialism and Chinese anti-colonialism provide a rationale for the African countries to be more trusting of China as being less likely to infringe upon their sovereignty.
Trust is defined here as the willingness of African states (the trustors) to accept foreign assistance, including loans, and become vulnerable to bilateral donors and lenders, specifically China and the U.S. (the trustees), while presuming that the latter will not act in ways that violate the former’s sovereignty, even in times of financial distress. Since each major power tends to adopt a uniform foreign policy approach towards African states as if they were a single entity, the application of relational trust theory does not focus on specific African nations. Instead, a generalized approach is taken to draw conclusions about each superpower’s trustworthiness in Africa.
Looking Back
In relational trust theory, past interactions play a crucial role in shaping judgments about a trustee’s trustworthiness. Africa’s historical relations with the U.S. and China are markedly different. It is nearly impossible to discuss Africa's history without referencing the transatlantic slave trade and Western colonialism, which represent over 500 years of exploitation of African labour and resources. While America benefited significantly from slave raids and European colonization of Africa states, China neither participated in nor directly profited from these brutal practices that contributed to Africa’s underdevelopment. Instead, motivated by its own historical experiences of imperial subjugation, China provided ideological, advisory, and military support to numerous African national liberation movements against colonial powers.
During the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, America, along with its Western European allies, supported or participated in military interventions in several African countries, sometimes resulting in the overthrow of leaders, as seen in Libya with Gaddafi. In contrast, consistent with its foreign policy of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty of African states, Beijing has refrained from supporting or engaging in any military operations that violate African sovereignty. China’s policy of non-interference stands in stark contrast to Washington’s reputation for using aid-for-reform deals to induce domestic policy changes in African nations, as exemplified by the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s that led to widespread privatization in Africa. If past interactions form the basis for relational trust and provide cues for future behaviour, Washington should not be surprised that African states appear to have turned a deaf ear to the first Trump administration.
Looking Forward
Perceptions of anticipated future interactions also influence the varying degrees of trustworthiness attributed to America and China in Africa. From a forward-looking perspective, China’s status as a rising power, its Belt and Road Initiative—which is unmatched in its commitment to infrastructure development in Africa and globally—along with its frequent presidential visits and pledges made during the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summits, demonstrate Beijing’s eagerness to foster close relations with Africa. Conversely, during his first term, President Trump did not visit Africa and made disparaging remarks about African nations. In relational trust theory, neglecting the relationship with the trustor signals a tendency to defect, thereby diminishing trust. While some African countries, such as Ethiopia and Cameroon, have recently signed agreements to elevate their bilateral relations with China to strategic partnerships, the U.S., even under Trump 2.0, has not made significant economic commitments to African states.
To close the gap with China in Africa, America under Trump must enhance its trustworthiness. The Trump administration could redeem itself by taking reparative steps. First, Trump should visit Africa during his second term to genuinely connect with the continent and its interests. Second, he should apologize for his derogatory comments, as a sincere apology would signal respect and tolerance—virtues conducive to building more trusting and mutually beneficial relationships. Third, recognizing that every state has its shortcomings, U.S. officials should refrain from condemning China, especially since positive experiences of many African states with China are often overlooked in Washington’s criticisms. Failing to acknowledge any welfare-enhancing and state-legitimizing benefits of Chinese-funded projects across the African continent undermines the credibility of America’s anti-China rhetoric.
Afa’anwi Che is an Assistant Professor in International Studies at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, China. He is a 2019 grant and fellowship recipient from the China-Africa Research Initiative in Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He has published in various outlets, including Journal of Asian and African Studies, Third World Quarterly, Journal of Political Science Education, International Journal of Chinese Education, and The Conversation.
Email: afaanwi.che@xjtlu.edu.cn
Profile: https://scholar.xjtlu.edu.cn/en/persons/AfaanwiChe
Photo by Marina Leonova
