The Whirling of Power Tendencies between China and the US
Tendencies as to the correlation of power between China and the U.S. whirl around, argues Toro Hardy.
By mid-2021, those tendencies favoured China. Although the U.S. was clearly on top, Beijing was rapidly closing the gap. In the third quarter of 2023, however, Washington had consolidated its upper hand. Now, once again, China has a substantial advantage.
Act 1
By mid-2021, China gave the impression of having a whip hand. Its management of Covid looked highly efficient. Its no limits’ strategic partnership with Russia seemed to be placing the U.S. in a defensive position. Its clear-cut strategic consistency, which presented 2049 as the point in time when its world primacy would be attained, contrasted with America’s strategic zig-zagging. Its economy, in GDP’s absolute terms, was on track to surpass that of the U.S. by the turn of the decade. In sum, efficiency, strategic initiative, and economic growth, appeared to be on China’s side.
The example of Covid’s management seemed to speak volumes. By mid-June 2021, one billion Chinese citizens had been vaccinated, representing close to 40% of the 2.5 billion vaccine doses globally applied. China’s death toll, at that point, was just of a few thousand. By the end of May of that year, in contrast, the U.S. with just 4% of the world’s population exhibited 25% of global deaths. In contrast to the Chinese social discipline, the United States exhibited a picture of collective anarchy (Toro Hardy, 2022, pp. 62-66).
America’s dysfunctional Covid management presented itself as an example of its wide polarization, and of its inefficiency in solving big problems. Liberal democracy’s values were under siege by a powerful populist movement, while numerous collective needs stayed chronically unresolved. Meanwhile, trust in the United States amid its allies had reached a historical low. The chaotic withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan came on top of Trump’s four years of tempestuous dog-eat-dog foreign policy. In sum, the U.S. seemed to have lost its social cohesion, its efficiency, its strategic compass and much of its international credibility.
A simple example seemed to illustrate America’s accrued deficiencies: The decrepit state of its infrastructures. In its 2009 quadrennial report on the country’s infrastructures, the American Society of Civil Engineers had ranked it with an abysmal D. In 2021, the situation hadn’t improved much. That year’s quadrennial report slightly upgraded the nation’s infrastructure to a C-Minus. Faced with Congress’ gridlocks, this chronic problem seemed unsolvable. (Brzezinski, 2013, p. 51; p. 106; Schaper, 2021).
Act 2
By September 2023, the above picture had been substantially altered. A concatenation of domestic and international circumstances changed the direction of travel, once again putting America in the fast lane.
Amid the reasons of America’s advancement were the following. First, Biden’s domestic strategic clarity and his experience in dealing with Congress had allowed him to pass a group of transformational laws. Among them, the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act, the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. Together, they allowed for government investment of a trillion dollars in the modernization of the country’s economy and its re-industrialization. This included the consolidation of its technological leadership, the updating of its infrastructure and the reconversion of its energy matrix towards clean energy. Huge private investments linked to such laws presented themselves. These accomplishments proved that the U.S. could overcome its legislative gridlocks to modernize its economy and competitive standing.
Second, the U.S.’ mid-term elections appeared to prove that liberal democracy was able to keep at bay the powerful populist movement that threatened its survival. All the candidates for governors and senators that had denied the results of the 2020 presidential election were defeated.
Third, weakened alliances were significantly revitalized. Washington’s firm reaction in the face of Russia’s invasion to Ukraine showed Europeans that America’s leadership was still indispensable. The U.S. led in the articulation of these alliances and the revitalization of NATO, in sanctions against Russia, in the organization of help provided to Ukraine, and as primary source of military equipment and intelligence. Alliances in the Indo-Pacific were also buttressed and expanded. Among the security mechanisms or initiatives created or reinforced under Washington’s stewardship were an energized Quad; the emergence of AUKUS; NATO’s approach to that region; the tripartite Camp David security agreement between Japan, South Korea and the U.S.; and a revamped defence treaty with The Philippines.
While the U.S. showed an unexpected burgeoning, China moved in the opposite direction. First, China’s Zero Covid policy, which initially looked like a success, turned out to be an utter failure. Its inflexibility translated into a drastic deceleration of the country’s economic growth, and in the fracturing of its supply chains. Meanwhile, the dubious quality of it Covid vaccines merged with Beijing’s refusal to acquire effective American ones. Stubbornness and lack of flexibility deepened the problem (Pei, 2023).
Second, helped by the long closure imposed by its Zero Covid policy, China faced a serious economic downturn. Among the other factors in play were the overregulation of its private sector, with particularly the high-tech sector; the imposition of restrictions upon foreign investments; and the huge crisis of its real state sector. Both private consumption of durable goods and private investment fell dramatically, with the latter showing a two-third contraction in relation to 2015. On top, exports and imports fell simultaneously. Meanwhile, the U.S. imposed a blockade on superconductors that seemed to foreclose China’s access to a fundamental technology. Estimates that China would be surpassing America’s GDP in absolute terms by the turn of the decade, evaporated (Posen, 2023; Krugman, 2023; Goodman, 2023; Sharma, 2022).
Third, what was initially perceived as a potent geopolitical block between China and Russia, became a liability for Beijing. Russia’s military shortcomings in Ukraine seemed to present it as a giant with feet of clay. However, Beijing’s no limits strategic partnership with Moscow greatly antagonized the Europeans, with Ursula Van Der Leyen calling for a reduction of the risks involved in dealing with a “systemic rival” as China. As a result, NATO approached Japan and South Korea and engaged in the Indo-Pacific region (Center for European Policy Studies, 2023).
Final act?
Now, things have changed again, with head winds clearly favoring China. Trump 2.0 is of course responsible of propelling chaos into the U.S.’ domestic and international arenas. However, Xi Jinping is not only redressing several of China’s economic excesses, but Artificial Intelligence is making huge inroads. Meanwhile, multiple countries and regions battered by Trump are looking at China with new eyes.
Domestically, Trump is making federal bureaucrats feel vulnerable and insecure. In the words of Russel Vought, Director of the Office of Management and Budget: “We want bureaucrats to be traumatically affected” (Herman, 2025). This threatens to make a big mess of federal institutions, grossly degrading their capacity for policy implementation. Meanwhile, top universities and individual researchers are losing fundamental funding because the White House doesn’t like the way they’re governed. This seriously degrades America’s scientific and technological research standing, which comes on top of the decimation of federal health research institutions.
Trump’s tariff juggernaut, which will bring the effective tariff rate on imports to their highest level in a century, threatens a meaningful domestic recession. This would represent a policy induced economic downturn for an economy that less than 100 days ago was in robust health. Externally, tariffs are promoting the coalescence of affected counties, having the U.S. as the common economic adversary.
Adding to the economic resentment is the geopolitical one. Trump wants to build a world order dominated by nationalism and force, where the extension of the American landmass at the expense of others becomes the new normal. Moreover, while Russia is befriended, Ukraine is castigated. For Europe and Canada, Washington is no longer a friendly place. While for the incoming German Chancellor the aim is “independence from the U.S.A.” and the new Canadian Prime Minister stated that “the old relationship we had with the United States is over” (Sanger, 2025).
China - where Xi has shown friendly gestures towards the private sector and where Artificial Intelligence has recently made advances - is becoming the unavoidable shore to be approached in these upside-down times. According to David Sanger: “China declared that its trade minister had agreed with Japan and South Korea…on a common response to Mr. Trump’s actions” (Sanger, 2025). If Washington’s two most powerful treaty allies in the Pacific approach Beijing, what to expect from the rest? Not only is the Global South is moving closer to China to withstand the emerging turbulence, but Europe itself is “turning to Chinese alternatives to de-risk from the US” (Bego, 2025). All roads will tend to lead to China while sidestepping the U.S.
Not only has the U.S. shot itself in the foot, but China will become the big winner of Trump’s induced economic and geopolitical upheavals. The tendencies on the balance of power not only favor China again, but are likely to remain for the foreseeable future. The whirling could well be over, with China ending on top.
Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD, is a retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Formerly, Fulbright scholar, Visiting Professor at the universities of Princeton and Brasilia, online Professor at the University of Barcelona, academic advisor to the University of Westminster, and a two-times Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center Resident Scholar.
Photo by Johannes Plenio
References
Bego, Katja (2025). “Trump is pushing Europe and China closer together”, Chatham House, 27 February.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2013). Strategic Vision, New York: Basic Books.
Center for European Policy Studies (2023). “The EU’s aim to de-risk is risky… yet necessary”, 7 September.
Goodman, Peter S. (2023). “China’s Stalling Economy Puts the World on Notice”, The New York Times, August 11.
Herman, Alice (2025). “Russell Vought: Trump appointee who wants federal workers to be in ‘trauma’”, The Guardian, 10 February.
Krugman, Paul (2023). “Why is China’s Economy Stumbling?”, The New York Times, August 10.
Pei, Mixin (2023). “China’s Pro-Growth Happy Talk”, Project Syndicate, January 24.
Posen, Adam S. (2023). “The End of China’s Economic Miracle”, Foreign Affairs, August 2.
Sanger, David E. (2025). “Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ Tariffs Are Coming, but at a Cost to U.S. Alliances”, The New York Times, April 1.
Schaper, David (2021). “Potholes, grid failures, aging tunnels and bridges: Infrastructure gets a C-Minus”, MPR News, March 2.
Sharma, Ruchir (2022). “China’s economy will not overtake the US until 2060, if ever”, Financial Times, October 23.
Toro Hardy, Alfredo (2022). America’s Two Cold Wars, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
