Extremism and Ethnicity Part V - An Ethnic Pacification Model And Its Applications
In the fifth part of this six part series, Roland Benedikter further explores the problems, experiences, and options the model of regional autonomy of the Autonomous Province of South Tyrol-Alto Adige provides those interested in addressing intractable ethnic conflicts.
In judging the origin and effectiveness of the South Tyrol autonomy system as well as its potential usefulness for contemporary Iraq’s ethnic problems, it is important first of all to differentiate between the three concepts of autonomy, equality, and parity. They are not the same, but must all be integrated if a viable solution for notoriously complex multi-ethnic conflict areas is to be implemented. As the South Tyrol model teaches, ethnic conflicts are not necessarily about equality, but are in the first place about the self-determination of certain sub-groups within a more complex societal body. Such groups, like the Sunnis and other smaller groups in today’s Iraq, feel disadvantaged and demand a counter-offer for leaving ISIS. This implies at least temporary special treatment, which is usually perceived as “justice” by the ethnic minority groups and as “unjustified privilege” by the others, in particular by the majority (in our case the Shiites of Iraq) which has to concede special rights to the minorities in certain areas.
On the other hand, ethnic conflicts, even if provisioned with the most efficient solution mechanisms, will never reach full “justice” and can never be based on equality alone, but are about inducing and including parity in an encompassing consideration. Parity in such settings can mean many things: from “positive discrimination” in order to further “equal” chances (a contradiction in itself, although productive and potentially progressive), to territorial implementation rather than an ethnic solution in the strict sense, thus giving every citizen living in a special area the same rights of a privileged group, not only to the members of the minority group that is the majority in that given area. This is the case in South Tyrol, where the privileges of autonomy and self-government are beneficial to all citizens living on the territory, be they German, Italian, or Raetoroman native speakers, without distinction. Such an arrangement would mean that the Sunni “special areas” conceded to the Sunni tribes in certain areas of Iraq are not exclusively applied to the Sunnis living there, but to all Iraqi citizens in the area, including Shiites, Kurds and the many other ethnicities.
That in turn may lead to new conflict, as in the case of Italy where “normal” Italian citizens at times denounce the special rights of self-government of German native speakers living in South Tyrol as an unjustified discrimination that allegedly hurts the principle of equality of all Italians in a national perspective, as well as certain fundamentals of the rule of law with regard to equal individual rights anchored in the Italian national constitution. Others fear that regional autonomies may become one additional factor among many that are tending to “break Iraq apart” – with or without ISIS, as a result of ethnic fractions that undermine the unity of the nation. These issues are also three main reasons why the Western democracies—centered on the constitutional rights of the individual—hesitate to deal with special group rights.
What could be the potential effects of such or similar autonomy regulations on the Sunni tribes, on other minorities, and on Iraq as a nation?
According to the South Tyrol experience, the best solution both in the Sunni areas and in other regions with strong numbers of minorities (and with a mix of minorities including a minority of the national Shia majority), as far as can be seen today, could be local federalization between the major ethnic groups within a regional autonomy paradigm following the South Tyrol model—but only if such a model is implemented through a sober, non-idealistic approach that doesn’t ignore the differences and complexities between autonomy, equality, justice, and parity.
In particular, some basic components of the South Tyrol model could be transferred to ethnic conflict areas in post-ISIS Iraq, such as: ethnically differentiated regional tax autonomy, regional distribution of money according to percentages of ethnic population, guarantees for ethnic representation in the autonomous regional government and parliament, and systematic cultural (including educational) multipolarity and independence—all of these as an alternative to ethnic separatism. Particularly in areas with a high amount of “mixed” coexistence between different ethnic groups, it might be wise to install parallel cultural and school administrations, and to give national and international guarantees for language and heritage autonomy. Concerning all of these proposals, the South Tyrol autonomy should not be merely seen as a model to copy, but as an example of concrete success that can help to identify appropriate, original, local solutions according to the practical needs of discrete situations, and after carefully listening to the requests of the people directly living in the affected places.
In short, following the South Tyrol model the Sunni, Kurd and other (on average, smaller) minority areas would become autonomous zones within the national border of Iraq, administered by a regional or local government elected by the local or regional residents and equipped with primary and secondary legislative powers. The autonomous areas would be entitled to establish independent bilingual schooling systems where the national minorities would have their own self-administered schools.
All Sunni, Shia and other ethnicities would by law be represented in the regional government and parliament according to their percentages in the overall numbers of the population, and if that percentage is too small, then if appropriate through “positive discrimination.” Money for cultural and educational issues, including heritage protection, would be distributed among the ethnicities according to census percentages. The national government of Iraq would keep overall sovereignty, while taxes collected within the autonomous zones would belong exclusively to the autonomous region and be distributed among the ethnic groups, again according to population.
While the Iraqi national state would continue to control the military in order to secure borders, the autonomous zones would have their own police forces responsible for domestic security. They would have primary legislative powers in the fields of agricultural development, environment, fishing and hunting, housing (both public and private), industry, transport, demographic development and tourism, among others. Last but not least, the autonomous governments would be entitled to contain further immigration from other areas, following the outcome of negotiations between its resident ethnic groups. The respective agreements could be supervised by “neutral” neighbors such as the European Union, following the practice of supervision and guarantee of the South Tyrol model in Italy. Such a “greater” arrangement could in turn help to decisively improve Iraqi relations with Saudi Arabia and its other neighboring Sunni nations, and thus serve as trust-building measure with positive long-term effects on the geopolitics of the region. It could also help to bolster the international role of the EU and to stimulate it to become step by step a more concretely helpful player in problems areas.
To be continued…
Roland Benedikter is Research Scholar at the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies of the University of California at Santa Barbara. The author thanks Victor Faessel, Phd, Program Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies of the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), for advising on this text. Read part IV here.
Photo credit: US Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Erica R. Gardner / Foter / Public Domain Mark 1.0
