How does one explain the variation in the EU's success in enacting and enforcing policies that lead to the supply of regional or global public goods? We examine how the EU deploys its positional resources to enact laws that compel governments or firms to contribute to the provision of public goods. We suggest that leaders such as the EU are able to compel public goods contributions if they have the legal authority to do so, and are able to deploy their positional resources to build effective coalitions or reduce the leverage of potential veto players. We look at two issue areas empirically: banking and the environment. In the banking cases, the EU sought to provide regional public goods; in the environmental cases, it sought to provide regional and global public goods. We examine instances of leadership success as well as failure. In the banking cases, we examine Outright Monetary Transactions (success) and banking single resolution mechanism (less successful); the environmental cases pertain to chemical regulation (success) and airline emissions (failure). These cases reveal the EU's skill and limitations in deploying its positional authority to induce contributions for public goods provision from EU member governments, EU firms and nonEU firms.