This article examines the resource management design of international courts (ICs) and asks: how are ICs designed in terms of the management of resources and what factors contribute to the resource management design of ICs? Theoretically, this article draws on existing literature to conceptualize resource management as a design feature of international courts and considers three causal mechanisms that might shape the resource management design of ICs: diffusion by emulation, the uploading of domestic governance norms, and bureaucrats who pursue institutional independence and sustainability. Empirically, I examine the resource management design of 24 ICs and assess who selects their chief administrators and approves their budgets. A case study on the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is also analyzed in order to gain traction on the causal mechanisms generating resource management design of ICs. The article shows that there is a strong tendency for ICs to have greater control over the appointment of their chief administrators, but less control over their budgets. States generally retain authority to approve ICs’ budgets. Moreover, it suggests that domestic judicial norms and national legal bureaucrats influenced the design of the CCJ's resource management.
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