How to Fix the Representation Problem of the G20
Danny Bradlow and Robert H. Wade call for a limited form of representation for all the world’s states.
The Trump administration has not hesitated to express its hostility to multilateral bodies. A case in point is the administration’s decision to downgrade its participation in G20 ministerial meetings. First, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that he would not attend the meeting of G20 foreign ministers because he rejected the priorities that South Africa, the G20 chair for 2025, had set for its presidency, which he identified as diversity, equality, and climate change. Second, the US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent indicated that he would not attend the G20 finance ministers meeting because he had more important business in Washington. Both officials sent relatively junior officials to represent the US in these meetings. Their actions were particularly noticeable because the US, which will chair the G20 in 2026, is part of the troika that is responsible for managing the G20 process in 2025.
The G20 is an informal gathering, which claims to be “the premier forum for international economic cooperation”. It was established at finance minister’s level in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, and upgraded to summit level, with the same membership, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The summit is held annually, under the leadership of a rotating presidency.
The membership comprises 19 of the “weightiest” national economies plus the European Union and the African Union. The 19 national economies include the G7 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada), Australia, plus China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina. The group, which includes about 10% of the states in the world, accounts for 67% of the world’s population, 85% of global GDP, and 75% of global trade.
The G20 has had a mixed record. It has an intense work programme focused on addressing many of the most significant international economic, financial, environmental and social challenges. The consistency in G20 membership has proven to be an advantage because it helps foster a sense of familiarity and understanding at the technical level among the permanent members, which is helpful in times of crisis and in dealing with complex problems.
But its exclusivity and informal status has limited its ability to address these challenges. This is particularly because in many cases an effective response requires agreement and action by all states.
Over time, as tensions in international relations have grown, the shortcomings in the structure of the G20 have become more evident. Despite its economic weight, the G20 has a basic legitimacy problem. It is a self-selected group whose members, except for the African Union and the European Union, represent only themselves. The African Union claims to represent all Sub-Saharan African countries and the European Union makes the same claim for European countries. It is not clear that these supranational bodies make a systematic effort to learn the views and concerns of their member countries and to represent these views in G20 forums.
One way for the G20 to overcome this representation problem is to learn from other bodies facing the same issue. The governance model of the Financial Stability Board provides a model. Established in 2009, the FSB has the same permanent members as the G20. The Banque de France, looking back from 2024 on the FSB’s 15-year history, describes it as the “guardian” of global financial stability.
Unlike the G20 the FSB makes a systematic effort to learn the views of non-FSB members. It has established six Regional Consultative Groups (RCGs), one each for the Americas, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan region. The objective is to expand and formalize the FSB’s outreach activities beyond the G20 membership and better reflect the global character of the financial system.
The RCGs operate in a formal framework which promotes compliance within each region with FSB financial policy initiatives. The framework enables the group members to share among themselves and with the FSB their views on common problems and solutions and on the issues on the FSB’s agenda. Each RCG is co-chaired by an official from an FSB government and an official from a non-member institution.
Applying the FSB model to the G20 would allow the current members of the G20 membership to continue, while obliging them to establish a consultation process with regional neighbours, thereby creating a limited form of representation for all the world’s states. It would also establish a limited form of G20 accountability towards the international community.
Danny Bradlow is a Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria and Senior G20 Advisor to South African Institute of International Affairs.
Robert H. Wade is Professor of Global Political Economy, London School of Economics.
Photo by Maria Tyutina
