From Restraint to Retaliation: Indus Waters Treaty, Operation Sindoor, and the Dawn of a New Era in South Asia
Amal Chandra argues that the recent terror attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, and India’s response through Operation Sindoor mark more than a singular episode of cross-border tension. They signify a paradigmatic rupture in the postcolonial diplomatic architecture of South Asia.
What began as a measured act of military and diplomatic retaliation has triggered a seismic shift in the region’s geopolitical dynamics. In particular, India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), once considered the crown jewel of hydro-diplomacy, and Pakistan’s retaliatory threat to withdraw from the Simla Agreement signal the unravelling of legal frameworks that have historically anchored regional peace.
This post examines how these developments reflect a broader transformation in treaty behaviour, international legal norms, and the evolving doctrine of coercive diplomacy. It interrogates whether South Asia is entering a new era in which treaties are no longer seen as sacrosanct instruments of cooperation but as tools of strategic leverage, capable of being weaponised in response to security threats. In doing so, it raises fundamental questions about the durability of international law in conflict-ridden regions and the future of interstate relations in a nuclearized, climate-stressed subcontinent.
The Indus Waters Treaty: From Stability to Strategic Variable
Signed in 1960 under World Bank mediation, the Indus Waters Treaty has long been upheld as a rare success in conflict management. It divided the waters of the Indus basin between India and Pakistan, allocating the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. More than just an apportionment agreement, the IWT created an institutional structure for data sharing, dispute resolution, and technical exchange, insulating water cooperation from broader political tensions.
Remarkably, the treaty survived three wars and countless skirmishes, offering a model of functional cooperation amidst enmity. Yet its resilience should not be mistaken for invulnerability. In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, India announced an accelerated timeline for hydroelectric projects on the Chenab, specifically, the Ratle, Pakal Dul, Kiru, and Kwar dams. These projects, though arguably within India's rights under the IWT, were seen by Pakistan as a violation of both the spirit and structure of the agreement.
India’s decision to place the IWT “in abeyance” marks a fundamental shift in its treaty posture. The suspension of regular commissioner meetings and data exchanges renders the cooperative mechanisms of the IWT effectively defunct. More significantly, India has reframed the treaty from being a normative obligation to a strategic instrument, subject to alteration in response to cross-border provocations. The move aligns with a global trend where resource-sharing treaties are increasingly securitised.
Operation Sindoor and the Doctrine of Coercive Treaty Retaliation
Unlike previous retaliatory strikes, such as the 2016 surgical strikes or the 2019 Balakot airstrike, Operation Sindoor was accompanied by deliberate diplomatic and infrastructural actions. This signals the articulation of a new foreign policy doctrine: coercive treaty retaliation. Under this doctrine, treaties are not ends in themselves but leverage tools, disrupted to impose material and symbolic costs on state actors accused of sponsoring terrorism.
This redefinition of treaties as instruments of coercion challenges the normative assumptions of international law. India’s move is rooted in the belief that cooperation cannot be unilaterally maintained in the face of persistent security threats. By disrupting the IWT, India transforms water, a shared ecological good, into a means of geopolitical signalling, asserting that normative cooperation must be contingent on reciprocal political will.
Internationally, parallels can be drawn to Russia’s manipulation of gas supplies to Europe, Turkey’s upstream damming of the Tigris and Euphrates, and Ethiopia’s unilateral actions on the Nile. However, India’s doctrine is distinguished by its moral framing: treaty disruption is presented not as opportunism, but as a necessary response to ‘state-sponsored’ terrorism.
Pakistan’s Countermove: The Simla Agreement in Jeopardy
In a counter-escalatory gesture, Pakistan has threatened to exit the 1972 Simla Agreement, a foundational accord that institutionalised bilateralism in dispute resolution and affirmed the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. Signed in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, Simla symbolised a mutual commitment to procedural diplomacy and internal conflict management.
Though more symbolic than substantive in recent decades, Simla provided a vital scaffolding for structured engagement. Its potential repudiation reflects not just Pakistan’s frustration with India’s hardened stance but also a possible pivot toward the internationalisation of the Kashmir issue, a move historically resisted by India. Yet, given Islamabad’s economic fragility and diplomatic isolation, such international appeals are unlikely to bear fruit.
The erosion of Simla and the IWT underscores a broader collapse of legalism in South Asia’s interstate relations. Treaties, once viewed as stabilising anchors, are now seen as conditional arrangements, subject to strategic recalculation rather than normative fidelity.
Legal Fragility and the Limits of International Norms
The unilateral suspension of the IWT by India raises thorny questions about the applicability and enforceability of international legal norms. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties permits termination or suspension only in the event of a “fundamental change of circumstances” not anticipated by the parties. Whether cross-border terrorism qualifies as such remains a matter of legal debate.
More troubling is the institutional impotence of international guarantors. The World Bank, a key architect and mediator of the IWT, has been effectively sidelined, lacking the enforcement tools or diplomatic leverage to ensure compliance. This highlights a structural weakness in international treaty law: its reliance on mutual restraint rather than binding enforcement.
In regions of persistent hostility, legal norms become fragile constructs. When national security concerns eclipse procedural commitments, treaties are likely to be reinterpreted, suspended, or ignored. In such scenarios, power trumps principle, and realism supplants liberal institutionalism.
The End of Compartmentalised Diplomacy
One of the defining features of South Asian diplomacy over the decades has been compartmentalisation—the idea that functional cooperation (e.g., on trade or water) can coexist with deep political antagonism. The IWT embodied this logic, preserving hydro-cooperation despite conflict.
Operation Sindoor disrupts this paradigm. It signals India’s belief that compartmentalisation no longer serves its strategic interests. By linking treaty obligations to counterterrorism goals, India has introduced conditionality into what were previously unconditional arrangements. This is not merely a tactical move but a strategic reorientation of regional diplomacy.
Pakistan’s response, while reactive, similarly reflects a willingness to abandon proceduralism in favour of symbolic assertion. The mutual erosion of Simla and IWT reflects a broader shift from trust-based interdependence to zero-sum conditionality.
South Asia is among the most water-stressed regions in the world, and climate change is accelerating inter-riparian tensions. The weaponisation of water may yield short-term strategic leverage but poses long-term ecological and humanitarian risks.
In this context, a shift from bilateral treaties to multilateral frameworks is imperative. Regional models like the Mekong River Commission or the Arctic Council offer partial templates. A South Asian Water Council—independent, science-led, and politically insulated—could enable climate adaptation, data transparency, and cooperative water governance.
Track II diplomacy also needs urgent revitalisation. Former diplomats, hydrologists, civil society actors, and legal scholars must engage in sustained dialogue to rebuild a normative consensus around shared resources. Legal instruments can only function when backed by political will and societal trust. Both are in short supply—but not irrecoverable.
Conclusion: Between Sovereignty and Stewardship
The developments surrounding Operation Sindoor, the Indus Waters Treaty, and the Simla Agreement signal more than the disintegration of bilateral accords. They mark the twilight of an era defined by procedural diplomacy and postcolonial restraint.
The new era is one of strategic ambiguity and conditional cooperation, where treaties are no longer sacred but strategic. Whether this leads to credible deterrence or dangerous instability remains to be seen. What is certain is that the future of South Asia cannot be built on instrumentalised diplomacy alone.
As glaciers melt, rivers dry, and populations swell, the region stands at a crossroads. It can continue down the path of retaliatory politics, or it can choose the ethics of stewardship. Between the politics of retribution and the promise of coexistence lies the challenge, and the hope of a new regional system.
Amal Chandra is an Indian author, political analyst, and columnist. He holds a postgraduate degree with distinction from the Department of Politics and International Studies and currently serves as a program official at the Central University of Gujarat.
Photo by Ali Madad Sakhirani
