Brexit and the Future of Scotland’s Demographics
Harry Sanders looks for international models to solve Scotland's growing demographic crisis.
After years of discussion and debate, Brexit appeared to move one step further towards realisation as the United Kingdom entered the transition period in January. Progress was seen by many to be a good thing; however, the nation is still just as divided over Brexit as it has been since the referendum. Much of this disunity lies in the uncertainty of the fates of the UK’s constituent countries- especially Scotland, which voted overwhelmingly to remain in the European Union by 62%. Despite this sizeable majority, the impact of Brexit will now be felt just as strongly north of the border. With this in mind, it is important to learn what will happen to Scotland and its people come the conclusion of the transition period (that is, if the recent COVID-19 outbreak does not interrupt the current schedule).
Scotland’s Demographic Situation
In the coming decades, Scotland’s labour market faces a potential crisis. With one of the lowest birth-rates in Europe, the country’s population is increasingly top-heavy. Between 2000 and 2018, Scotland’s population growth was just 0.4% per year, with the number of people aged at least 75 growing by 31% in the same timeframe. This trend is not a good sign for Scottish industry- if the current trajectory continues, the country’s workforce will diminish beyond sustainable levels.
This information is certainly concerning, though it is made even more so by the revelation that Scotland’s recent population growth has been driven by positive net migration - not by the “natural” increase in births over deaths. This is not to say that Scotland’s population is overwhelmingly comprised of overseas migrants - non-UK nationals account for only 6.6% of the population- but without this migration it is certainly stagnating, and a demographic crisis appears unavoidable.
Since the first Scottish Executive of 1999, several strategies have been suggested and implemented in order to combat this growing problem- including upskilling current workers, improving attainment in schools, and attracting migrants to the country to fill gaps in the labour market. However, the tradition of centralised decision-making in this area means that Scotland is largely powerless to address the situation- control over immigration has historically been concentrated in the hands of the UK government. A paper published in 2018 suggested options for devolving certain powers over immigration to the Scottish Parliament, though this is still ongoing. Moreover, further devolution seems unlikely in the near future, with Westminster seemingly intransigent in their opposition to such plans.
The Canadian Example
In order for Scotland to best determine how a devolved immigration system should be structured, there are a number of international examples that can be looked at. One particularly apt case study is the Canadian immigration system. Whilst there are obviously vast differences between the UK and Canada - such as size and population density - Canada’s sub-regions have differing demographic and economic needs in the same way that Scotland and England do. So that these needs can be addressed, Canada’s immigration system has regional differentiation, whereby local level governments have the power to select immigrants whose characteristics - such as age and skill level- will be particularly beneficial.
In light of the risks that Brexit poses to Scotland’s labour market, it would be hugely advantageous if the Scottish Government could select migrants in this way. Skills gaps could be remedied, and the ageing population could be, to an extent at least, addressed. Canada’s provinces assess immigration applications against the unique criteria they have devised, before nominating applications to the national government for approval. This allows the national government to retain responsibility for security and border control, whilst providing provinces with the ability to meet their demographic and economic challenges. A system that shares responsibility in this way would perhaps be the most palatable option for Westminster, as it would still have the final say on who enters the country.
The success of the Canadian model can be demonstrated through the migrant retention rates of the various provinces. In Alberta for example, it is as high as 82% after five to eight years. Taking this into account, the introduction of a similarly successful scheme in the UK would go some way towards diffusing Scotland’s ‘demographic timebomb’.
Immigration Post-Brexit
Despite migration being the only factor maintaining and increasing Scotland’s working population, even the small effect that it is having will soon be stripped from the country post-Brexit. One of the cornerstones of the Brexit debate has been the promise of tighter border control and increased restrictions on immigration into the United Kingdom. To achieve this, EU workers have had their right to ‘freedom of movement’ in the UK removed, leaving them on the same terms as those from the rest of the world. Under these terms, EU migrants would have to apply for a Tier 2 work visa - which they would not be eligible for unless they secured a salary of at least £25,600 and met further ‘points-based’ criteria.
As Scotland’s median salary is already below the £25,600 threshold, EU workers will be hard-pressed to gain entry to the country and Scotland’s economy will surely suffer for it.
Proposals for a ‘Scottish Visa’
Proposals have been made to alleviate the potential damage of the type of sudden nosedive Scotland’s net migration would take due to Brexit. First Minister Nicola Sturgeon recently suggested a Scottish Visa, which would allow migrant workers to enter Scotland with fewer restrictions than those forecasted for post-Brexit Britain. Possession of this visa would be dependent on residence in Scotland as well as a Scottish tax code, ensuring that Scotland would see the benefits of such migration and ensure that its demographic and economic concerns would be dealt with. Furthermore, it is hoped that such measures would help to encourage a less restrictive outlook on the future of immigration for the whole of the UK.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, these proposals were promptly rebuffed by the UK government. Indeed, it took mere hours from Nicola Sturgeon’s announcement for Whitehall to announce that “immigration will be a reserved matter”, and that no such powers would be granted.
Sadly, this response is typical of the way Scotland’s concerns over Brexit have been disregarded. Calls for a new independence referendum grow louder by the day, and it is becoming increasingly easy to understand why. If measures are not put in place to counter the clearly-signposted future collapse of the Scottish labour market and indeed the balance of its population, then Scotland will be tired of cries for devolution, and will likely move to realign itself as an independent land with free reign over issues of critical national importance such as this.
Harry Sanders is a writer for the Immigration Advice Service, an organisation of immigration solicitors.
Image: Pixabay via Pexels.
