The United States and its allies need to avoid caricaturing China in their foreign policies

Nicholas Ross Smith, from the University of Canterbury, argues that the temptation to essentialize China as simply being a Xi-led CCP monolith that will stop at nothing to re-integrate Taiwan and seek global domination overlooks the complexity of domestic politics in China. Basing policy on a simple caricature of China is a recipe for disaster.

Over the last month I have had the discomfort of engaging with various people from the DC think tank bubble. Discomfort not because these are not good people or good scholars but because of their bleak view of China and the trajectory of international politics.

Typically, the DC view is that conflict with China is inevitable, especially over Taiwan. The strategies and policy prescriptions being offered start with a prophecy that China – although estimates of when vary wildly – will undertake military action against Taiwan. Therefore, instead of considering the diplomatic options that the United States and its allies might have, the think tankers base their China strategies on the military options available to protect Taiwan.

The most popular of these strategies are the various forms of “deterrence by denial” that have been espoused in recent years. Denial is built on a belief that the United States must convince China that it would lose if it decided to attack Taiwan. For such a strategy to be credible, it necessitates that the United States places its “military on a war footing” with regards to China and significantly deepens its military presence and commitments in the Indo-Pacific. Such an outcome raises significant fears of a security dilemma emerging.

This pessimistic view of China is not isolated to DC as it can be increasingly discerned in other key capitals in the Indo-Pacific, such as Tokyo, Canberra and, to a lesser extent, Manilla and Wellington. Indeed, the evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept to being about the existential threat of China should be, unmistakenly, viewed as a United States-led development, especially since their decision in 2017 to designate China a strategic competitor.

The problem is the growing securitization of China is based on a simple Manichean caricature of China that is based less on the real world and more on imagined worst-case scenarios. This naturally lends itself to exaggeration and enables contentious claims to become accepted conventional wisdoms.

An example of this occurred when China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, undertook a Pacific-wide trip in 2022 to try and finalise a ‘pact’ to facilitate cooperation between China and ten Pacific Island Countries on issues such as policing, security, and data communications. One prominent China commentator labelled China’s actions in the Pacific as reminiscent of “Imperial Japan”. Such an analogy quickly falls away under scrutiny but it, nevertheless, demonstrates how easy it is to fall into the trap of seeing China as inherently evil. Adam Curtis calls this the “power of nightmares”.

What makes China such a convincing nightmare to the West is the perception that China is a monolith led by an ideological dictator in Xi Jinping. It is presented as a country that, under the CCP, only cares about global power and domination.

Yes, China is an authoritarian country and Xi Jinping has emerged as arguably the most powerful CCP figure since Mao Zedong, especially after he ensconced himself as president for life in 2018. As Xi’s grip on power has tightened, so has the space for dissent in China. Also, China has deepened its ties with a number of discontented international powers, most importantly Russia but also Iran and North Korea leading to the moniker: the “alliance of tyrants”.

But, treating China as a country where Xi has unconstrained power is a big mistake and belies the complexity of domestic politics in China. In their book ‘Fractured China’, Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri observe that when it comes to foreign policy, far from having clear grand strategic goals, China is actually inconsistent and contradictory in much of its external action. For the authors, this is because there is no “command-and-control” system of policymaking in place and, rather, an array of domestic actors are given significant space to formulate policies. This leads to significant domestic autonomy within the confines of the CCP’s general vision but also the rise of factions, all of which inhibit the development of a unitary foreign policy.

Thus, while China clearly covets greater international respect and influence, exactly how it aims to achieve this is not so clear. It might even be most appropriate to say China does not know exactly what it wants.

Of course, there are likely exceptions to this, and the issue of Taiwan has consistently emerged as a rallying cry to Xi Jinping, especially in light of the next milestone date for the CCP, the hundredth anniversary of the CCP in power in China: 2049.

Indeed, 2049 is regularly cited by Xi as representing the date that the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” will be completed. Reunification with Taiwan has typically been cited as a fundamental aspect of the broader rejuvenation project. Xi has also said that China’s goal is by 2049 to lead “the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence.”

However, importantly, such proclamations are mostly intended for domestic audiences and speak to the reliance the CCP has on nationalism as a source of legitimacy; a reliance that is increasing as China’s economic performance has continued to falter. Furthermore, given that 2049 is still a quarter of a century away, Xi can use strong rhetoric without placing any short-term expectations on himself or the CCP to make progress on reunification with Taiwan. The chances of Xi being in power in 2049 are extremely remote.

Yet, as we have seen with Putin’s actions in Ukraine, when an autocratic leader makes an emotive issue the centrepiece of their rule as a way of garnering domestic support, it can necessitate (often irrational) extraordinary actions, no matter the costs. But, a kneejerk equating of Putin with Xi, something which has seeped into some recent analyses of China and Taiwan is not helpful either. This is not only because Putin and Xi are different people but also because Russia and China are vastly different countries with vastly different histories, state-society relations, and internal power structures.

Ultimately, China’s immediate plans for Taiwan remain murky. No scenarios should be taken off the table, although no scenarios should be assumed as a fait accompli.

The worrying thing is that characterizing China as an existential threat to the West is something that is not easy to row back from. After all, how can diplomacy be seen as a viable option when you are dealing with a country that is perceived to be unremittingly seeking the destruction of everything that you hold dear?

Furthermore, breaking free from a perceptive prison like this often requires an extraordinary moment to shock people to their senses. Indeed, it took the threat of nuclear annihilation during the Cuban Missile Crisis for the United States and the Soviet Union to open regular channels for dialogue and once the dialogue started it ushered in a period of Détente that significantly de-escalated the Cold War until the 1980s.

Hopefully, the trajectory of Sino-American competition does not echo the Cold War and wiser heads prevail before a Cuban Missile Crisis of sorts occurs in Taiwan, especially as there is no guarantee that this time dialogue, not conflict will prevail.

Nicholas Ross Smith, Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury.

Image: Government of Russia WikiCommons Creative Commons Attribution 4.0