What shifts in the extent and patterns of China's blaming are observable at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? This article employs automated content analysis to measure the frequency of blaming by China and other permanent UNSC member states based on a dataset of all speeches (19,623 overall) in the UNSC from January 1995 to May 2022. Furthermore, it uses qualitative text analysis and network analysis to examine the targets of blaming in three different case studies of UN security governance—UN peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia (1998–2008), the UN sanctions regime against North Korea (2007–2017) and the broader peace and security discourse at the UNSC (2008–2018). The study conceptualizes Chinese blaming as a previously unexamined discursive strategy of compulsory power with potential long-term effects on shifts in productive power. However, the results indicate the absence of blaming-related shifts in the discursive space of the UNSC: China's rhetoric in the UNSC, compared with other UNSC members, has remained restrained over time. Variance in blaming behaviour between actors and across bilateral and multilateral settings seems to depend on strategic considerations that assess how to exert power most effectively.
Policy Implications
- UNSC members should pursue a common discursive approach and not allow themselves to be divided by blaming attempts against individual states.
- China and the Western members of the UNSC should deal with diplomatic issues that come before the Council on a case-by-case basis, rather than from a starting point of mutual hostility.
- UNSC members should consider how the logic (zero-sum vs. win-win) and public visibility of a negotiation situation may shape its discourse and accordingly design discursive strategies to keep the focus on the production of agreements.
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