Back to the Future of Warfare: Costs and Effects in the Middle East
Amidst the cost-benefit debates now surrounding the terms of intervention in the Middle East, Carter Page offers initial thoughts on the economic dimension.
The current debate over “boots on the ground” in Iraq and Syria has largely been based on false assumptions and analytic shortcuts, both in public opinion and amongst government decision makers alike. From a public perception standpoint, nearly two-thirds of Americans support airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Syria according to a recent poll. Among the more perceptive analyses recently seen on these matters, Jon Stewart is right to note the irony of another polling statistic that showed only 50% of Americans surveyed could correctly identify Syria on the map.
Last week, the White House explained that the 475 additional U.S. military service members now sent to Iraq would be assigned a range of tasks. “In addition to providing weapons, ammunition and equipment, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will train and advise Iraqi forces, including Kurdish forces, improving their ability to plan, lead and conduct operations against ISIL.”
The limited scope and objectives of the current American forces in Iraq are broadly equivalent to the vision for the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (MAAGV). President Eisenhower deployed the group in 1954 to assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, following the withdrawal of the French Army which had been sent a similar assistance mission by Truman. As quoted in an analysis at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College by Army Major Kevin Kilbride:
“MAAGV had limited personnel available to manage all the activities associated with manning, training, and equipping an army. The manning and equipping mission suffered because it was done while attempting to recover from French withdrawal and the instability of the [Republic of Vietnam]. The Vietnamese had to determine what they wanted their army to do and how they would wield it in a short amount of time... MAAGV built a force equipped with American weapons and doctrine, capable of providing internal security…”
While the current military assistance advisory group in Iraq may have a limited scope as was seen in the case of MAAGV, the risks of future Vietnam-style escalation remain significant – particularly in the absence of specific objectives.
But the debate surrounding the use of airstrikes or boots on the ground in the form of the new Military Assistance Advisory Group also distracts attention from a related question. At the core of the decision to avoid sending ground troops is the desire to avoid casualties of American and allied soldiers. After the thousands of lives lost during the first two wars in Iraq, the potential human costs of casualties in the third Iraq war clearly warrant such a close consideration. It has been suggested that the airstrike-focused strategy may confirm the widely held Islamist view that the West has no stomach for a fight. Whether attacks are launched via land or via the air, American and European willingness for a major expeditionary warfare endeavor may become even less attractive if a true assessment of the budgetary costs were introduced into the debate.
A new book by James Galbraith released last week includes a number of general conclusions and themes in the field of economics that a lot of people already know. Galbraith echoes accounts of current economic conditions that others including Daniel Alpert have previously described: “The years since the Great Crisis of 2008 have seen slow growth, high unemployment, falling home values, chronic deficits, a deepening disaster in Europe—and a stale argument between two false solutions, ‘austerity’ on one side and ‘stimulus’ on the other.”
Nevertheless, one of the book’s main contributions may be found in Galbraith’s explanation of what is causing all this. Among the four key factors that he shows are currently impeding a return to normal, the most compelling argument is found in Galbraith‘s description of, “the now-evident futility of military power”. He reverses some of the conventional wisdom regarding cause and effect. His key chapter on “The Futility of Force” explains how urbanization, the evolution of weapons and the media have made war so difficult. The conflict in Iraq and Syria vividly illustrates each of these factors. Retired U.S. Army Major General Robert Scales partially echoed these comments when he noted this week that, “The enemy knows that while we may have the most sophisticated military in the world, it is a military that remains ill-suited to defeat them. The truth is that missiles, ships and planes are mostly irrelevant when not used against a traditional military foe. It was true in Vietnam, and in Afghanistan.” Galbraith’s conclusions parallel Pope Francis’s statement on Saturday that “War Is Madness”, adding the economic arguments to back it up.
A “Wall Street” Perspective
By comparison, Robert Kagan only briefly bothers to mention economic considerations in a 2,000 word Wall Street Journal piece last week entitled "America's Dangerous Aversion to Conflict" despite the traditional focus of that publication as implied by its “Wall Street” title. He tersely says that current evil forces around the world such as IS “are not driven primarily by economic considerations”, implying that world powers should adjust accordingly and refocus efforts on the military. Although potential military and civilian casualties are not fully taken into account in his analysis either, it suggests that the economy and markets may be added to the list of sacrifices. Displaying a corresponding lack of analytic rigor, his prior assertion that superpowers don't get to retire ignores historical precedents from the Roman Empire to Napoleonic France and beyond.
Although Kagan’s flag waving and bravado may find close parallels in recent government statements from both sides of the Atlantic, other precedents suggest the value of a more focused collaborative approach. Any country planning to start a large fight may benefit from having a plan and relationships worked out rather than embarking on a haphazard attempt on its own. By comparison to recent events, George H.W. Bush watched Saddam invade Kuwait in August 1990 and quietly did his homework with intense diplomacy for over five months before the big alliance started bombing in January 1991. Sending Secretary of State Kerry to Europe and the Gulf to ask for help after bellicose and antagonistic speeches comes completely out of sequence.
Bombing in the Age of Sanctions
In an address from the White House last Wednesday, President Obama suggested that, “It is America that helped remove and destroy Syria’s declared chemical weapons so that they can’t pose a threat to the Syrian people or the world again.” Ironically, this preceded his statement that, “It is America that has rallied the world against Russian aggression, and in support of the Ukrainian peoples’ right to determine their own destiny.” This revisionist history does not consider how the collaboration between the U.S. and Russia allowed the parties to achieve the agreement on Syria’s chemical weapons in the first place.
Russia may have been a viable ally given its close correlation with U.S. interests in Iraq. Coincidentally, Iran has continued to serve as a principal supporter of the current U.S.-led intervention in Iraq despite the similar punishment of Washington’s continued sanctions against Tehran. While the limited military assistance advisory group (MAAG) approach may constrain impact, unfulfilled diplomatic potential remains the biggest loss and risk to future success.
Although economic analyses of warfare may receive less direct attention today, Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser wrote “An Economic Theory of Alliances” in 1966 for the RAND Corporation as the Vietnam War escalated. In the event that the strategic recommendations of economists like James Galbraith are ignored, a similar reconsideration of such tactical considerations may add greater perspective.
Carter W. Page is Founder and Managing Partner of Global Energy Capital LLC, an Adjunct Associate Professor at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and Energy Fellow at the Center for National Policy in Washington.
