Diplomatic Epistemology: Debating the Existence of Objective Knowledge at the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations
We can all agree a ball is blue but what that means, a diplomat representing a major Western state mused, is subject to conflicting interpretations. He was responding to a question about how one could determine whether a state was an abuser of human rights norms in a forum at the ongoing Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations at the UN building in New York City.
The promoters of a ‘robust’ ATT – the global civil society campaign Control Arms and a network of progressive states – argue that the final treaty text should clearly prohibit the sale or transfer of conventional weapons to states and armed groups that commit grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
But what would be the ‘yardstick’ for measuring compliance with such norms; a questioner from the floor of the forum on ATT implementation objected. While human rights are a ‘nice idea’ for ‘students and anybody else’, it was unclear to him whether they could be objectively defined.
The ensuing discussion resembled a convoluted graduate school seminar as diplomats appealed to their training in history and other disciplines in their claims about the nature of objectivity and subjectivity.
We should accept the ‘fact’ that there are ‘no objective facts’ instructed the diplomat who had earlier opined on the nature of whether the ball is objectively blue, with no indication of the irony and internal contradiction in his statement. ‘People reach different conclusions’ on any treaty, he argued, and so there could never be a final settled interpretation of what it would mean. Another representative seemed to agree: ‘only in an ideal world would criteria and their interpretation be absolutely harmonized.’
‘Objectivity for me,’ pondered a further delegate, is more ‘nuanced.’ He noted that whether a country is subject to a UN arms embargo is relatively easy to determine – either it is or it isn’t – whereas compliance with the complex distinctions of human rights provisions is more difficult to verify. Nevertheless, through precedent, history and ongoing conversations, perhaps the scope of interpretations could be narrowed.
The absurdity of hearing the global diplomatic corps pontificating on epistemology – the philosophy of knowledge – might seem a little rich. There is a long history of powerful people dissembling about the nature of truth and justice in ways that serve their own interests.
‘What is truth?’ Pontius Pilate shrugged, as he washed his hands and sentenced Jesus to death. Stanley Cohen at the London School of Economics has written eloquently about the knowledge denial strategies people use to avoid accountability for massive violations of human rights.
One official in the ATT forum sniffed that the definition of objectivity was ‘a theoretical debate we do not need to have here.’ But the nature of knowledge and how to measure compliance with norms is an issue that cannot be so easily dismissed. Indeed it lies at the heart of so many international treaties. The case for banning chemical weapons, landmines and cluster munitions rested on the idea that their particularly indiscriminate nature could be clearly demonstrated. Campaigners spent innumerable hours and considerable resources to gather ‘objective data’ to prove these weapons’ disproportionate humanitarian impact.
Brian Rappert, a sociologist who studies social norms on armaments, offers what I think is a sophisticated and useful way to deal with this issue. He acknowledges that any humanitarian or human rights norm is inherently ambiguous. Trying to prove that certain weapons (or states) are ‘objectively bad’ is a losing battle. As the diplomats at the ATT have observed, objectivity is a slippery concept.
Instead, Rappert argues we should both make visible the inherent ambiguities that exist and examine how standards and norms distribute responsibility for them. Who benefits the most from the ambiguity in its current form or in the proposed new regulations? Is it weapons traffickers or is it civilians? How can we narrow the room for maneuver and prevent the exploitation and abuse of human beings?
Indeed, the difficulty of defining standards is not an excuse to make them even less coherent and clear. The complexity of social realities should not be used as a pretext to institutionalize incoherence and opacity.
Thus rather than chasing the impossible goal of absolute objective standards in the ATT text, campaigners and progressive states should seek to promote treaty provisions that will reduce the ‘wiggle room’ for arms manufacturers, exporters and brokers who profit from killing and maiming noncombatants. This can be done through both stringent standards but also effective reporting requirements.
A completely ‘objective standard’ might be impossible. But through articulating regulations in clear prohibitive language – ‘shall not’, ‘should not’, ‘must not’, ‘will not’ – a robust treaty would encourage states to take a precautionary rather than laissez faire approach to ambiguity.
Moreover, by creating a comprehensive public record about the conventional arms trade, a robust ATT implementation mechanism could provide a shared set of data that would provide the common basis for deliberation, assessment and critical review of arms trade behavior.
While the world’s people might not all be able to agree on what the color of a ball means, they can establish that it is what a general consensus would consider blue and even regulate who can legitimately buy and sell such a ball.
Please see the second conference note - The World According to a Gun Lobbyist: The Self-Serving Ideology of Weapons Industry Pressure Groups - Arms Trade Treaty Conference Note 2
For more background on the Arms Trade Treaty process, see Matthew Bolton’s earlier blog posting and journal article for Global Policy. Read his blog at politicalminefields.com; follow him on Twitter, @politicalmines.
Matthew Bolton, Department of Political Science, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences, Pace University New York City.
